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Abstract: This paper presents a model of competing payment schemes. Unlike previous work on 
generic twosided markets, the model allows for the fact that in a payment system users on one 
side of the market (merchants) compete to attract users on the other side (consumers who may 
use cards for purchases). It analyzes how competition between card associations and between 
merchants affects the choice of interchange fees, and thus the structure of fees charged to 
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Recently several models of payment schemes have been developed in order to analyze the optimal structure
of fees in debit and credit card schemes. They ask the question: How much is charged to cardholders versus
merchants for card transactions? Policymakers in a number of jurisdictions have been concerned that
merchants pay too much to accept credit card transactions, costs that in their view are ultimately covered
by consumers who pay by other means (see Chang and Evans, 2000, and Chakravorti and Shah, 2003).
The optimal structure of cardholder and merchant fees was ﬁrst addressed by Baxter (1983), who
viewed a payment transaction as a joint service consumed by cardholders and merchants. He emphasized
the importance of a structure of fees for which cards are used whenever their joint transactional beneﬁts
exceed their joint costs. Baxter’s was a normative analysis. Schmalensee (2002) and Rochet and Tirole
(2002) have since provided positive analyses, explaining what determines the structure of fees set by a
payment card association (such as MasterCard or Visa). While Schmalensee focuses on the trade-oﬀ
between attracting cardholders and attracting merchants, Rochet and Tirole analyze a corner solution in
which all merchants accept cards in equilibrium. A key feature of Rochet and Tirole’s model is that they
derive consumer and merchant demand from ﬁrst principles, allowing for the fact merchants compete
to attract customers (some of whom may be cardholders). Wright (2003a) combines elements of both
approaches to explore the sources of divergence between the privately and socially optimal fee structures.
However, all of these authors assume there is just one payment system that is choosing its price structure.1
This paper relaxes this assumption.
In considering how competition between payment schemes determines the structure of fees between
cardholders and merchants, this paper also falls within the recent literature on two-sided markets. These
markets have the property that there are two types of agents that wish to use a common platform, and
the beneﬁts of each side depend on how many users there are on the other side of the network. Rochet
and Tirole (2003) provide a general model of platform competition in a two-sided market. Examples they
give include Adobe Acrobat (Acrobat Reader and Writer), payment cards (cardholders and merchants),
platforms (hardware/console and software providers), real estate (home buyers and sellers), shopping
malls (shoppers and retailers), and Yellow Pages (readers and advertisers). In contrast to their model
of a single payment scheme (Rochet and Tirole, 2002), they treat users on both sides as end users,
abstracting from the fact that an important feature of some of these markets is that one side competes
amongst itself to sell to the other side (e.g. merchants, software providers, home sellers, retailers and
advertisers).2 In contrast, we allow for competition between merchants (sellers)
In addition to allowing for competition between merchants and competition between schemes, we
also allow for consumers to make separate card-holding and card-usage decision. Our main analysis is
presented in terms of a model of two competing card associations, such as MasterCard and Visa. For such
schemes the structure of cardholder and merchant fees is determined by the level of the interchange fee, a
fee set collectively by the members of the associations. The interchange fee is paid by the merchant’s bank
to the cardholder’s bank on each card transaction. A higher interchange fee results in higher merchant
fees and lower card fees. We model how the two types of competition alter the equilibrium interchange fee,
and compare this to the socially optimal level. To obtain sharp results, we focus on the benchmark case
1This is also true of other recent models in the literature including Chakravorti and To (2000), Gans and King (2003),
Schwartz and Vincent (2002), Wright (2003b), and Wright (2003c). Rochet and Tirole (2002) do discuss the impact of
scheme competition in their model, but they do not ﬁnd the resulting equilibrium.
2Other papers that model two-sided markets also abstract from the strategic interaction between sellers. These include
Armstrong (2002), Caillaud and Jullien (2001, 2003), Parker and Van Alstyne (2000), and Schiﬀ (2003).
1in which consumers view the two types of cards as providing identical transactional beneﬁts for making
purchases, and merchants view the two types of cards as providing identical transactional beneﬁts for
receiving payment.
To compare results from our model with those of Rochet and Tirole (2002), we start with the bench-
mark case in which there is only a single card scheme, before allowing for competition between schemes in
which consumers choose whether to hold none, one or both cards, and merchants choose whether to accept
none, one or both cards. To see how merchant competition matters, in each case we start with a model
in which the merchant is a monopolist, and so does not use card acceptance as a strategic instrument of
competition. We then consider what happens when merchants compete in a Hotelling fashion.
A key determinant of the competitive fee structure (and interchange fee) is the extent to which con-
sumers hold one or two cards when making purchases. With both forms of merchant behavior considered,
when consumers only choose to hold one card, competition between card schemes does not result in lower
interchange fees. In this case, by attracting cardholders, card schemes have a monopoly over access to
these cardholders. This leads competing card schemes to care only about the surplus they can oﬀer to
cardholders, leaving no surplus to merchants (the case of a competitive bottleneck).
This competitive bottleneck outcome can be undermined provided some consumers hold both cards.
Then the unique equilibrium in our model involves competing card schemes seeking to attract merchants
exclusively, by oﬀering maximal incentive for merchants to accept their cards. In the case of monopolistic
merchants, this implies maximizing the expected surplus oﬀered to merchants. In the case of competing
merchants, this involves maximizing the expected joint surplus of consumers and merchants, given that
competing merchants take into account the beneﬁts that their customers get from being able to use
cards. In either case, interchange fees are lower to the extent there is competition between schemes, but
higher to the extent there is competition between merchants. When the two eﬀects are combined, so
there is competition between schemes and between merchants, the equilibrium interchange fee remains
ineﬃciently low, but only to the extent that issuers and acquirers obtain positive margins.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present our model, starting with the case of
a single card scheme. Section 3 considers the case of two identical competing payment card associations.
Section 4 considers several extensions and implications of our analysis. Section 4.1 shows that our results
also hold for the case of competing proprietary schemes, like American Express and Discover card, that
set their cardholder and merchant fees directly. Section 4.2 considers how our results extend to allow for
merchant heterogeneity. Section 4.3 explains how the existence of some cash-constrained consumers alters
the equilibrium fee structure. Implications for policy and for the analysis of other two-sided markets are
discussed in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. Finally, Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 A single card scheme
We start by considering the simpler case of a single payment scheme where the only alternative to using
cards is cash, before introducing competing payment schemes in the next section. This allows some of
the analysis we will use in the next section to be ﬁrst developed in a simpler setting. It also allows our
model to be compared to the framework of Rochet and Tirole (2002) in the case in which there is only a
single payment scheme. In addition to considering strategic merchants, as they do, we also allow for the
case of monopolistic merchants, and for consumers to make separate joining and card usage decisions.
Another diﬀerence between our model and theirs is that in our model consumers are assumed to receive
their particular draw of transactional beneﬁts from using cards once they have chosen which merchant
2to purchase from.
In the model of Rochet and Tirole, consumers get their draw of transactional beneﬁts before they
choose which merchant to purchase from. Clearly our timing assumption is made for modelling conve-
nience. We think it is a reasonable modelling approach for two reasons. First, with our set-up, consumers
still choose which merchant to purchase from (in the case of competing merchants) taking into account
the expected beneﬁts from using cards versus the alternative payment instrument. By accepting cards,
merchants will raise consumers’ expected beneﬁt from purchasing from them, since consumers will gain
the option of using cards for purchases. In fact, this section shows the timing assumption does not alter
the equilibrium conditions under which merchants accept cards or consumers use cards: they are equiv-
alent to the condition derived in Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Wright (2003a) for a Hotelling model of
merchant competition, and to the condition derived in Baxter (1983) and Wright (2003c) in the case of
monopolistic merchants. Thus, we do not think this particular timing assumption is driving the results
we obtain. Additionally, the timing assumption can be motivated by the idea that consumers only learn
of their particular need to use various types of payments once they are in the store.
A card association represents the joint interests of its members, who are issuers (banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions which specialize in servicing cardholders) and acquirers (banks and other ﬁnancial
institutions which specialize in servicing merchants). In such an open scheme, a card association sets an
interchange fee a to maximize its members’ collective proﬁts.3 The interchange fee is deﬁned as an amount
paid from acquirers to issuers per card transaction. In addition, we assume a cost of cI per transaction
of issuing and cA per transaction of acquiring. A proprietary scheme incurs the cost cI + cA of a card
transaction. Competition between symmetric issuers and competition between symmetric acquirers then
determines the equilibrium fee per transaction for using cards, f, and the equilibrium fee per transaction
for accepting cards, m. In the case of a proprietary card scheme such as American Express, the scheme
sets f and m directly to maximize its proﬁts.
We follow Rochet and Tirole (2003, Section 6.2) and make the simplifying assumption that competition
between symmetric issuers and between symmetric acquirers leaves some small constant equilibrium
margin to issuers and to acquirers, so that
f(a) = cI − a + πI (1)
where πI is some small constant proﬁt margin.4 Likewise, merchant fees are
m(a) = cA + a + πA, (2)
where πA is some small constant proﬁt margin. Intense intra-platform competition results in (as a ﬁrst
order approximation) the number of card transactions being taken as given, so that symmetric Hotelling
or Salop style competition between banks would lead to the above equilibrium fees.
Card fees can be negative to reﬂect rebates and interest-free beneﬁts oﬀered to cardholders based on
their card usage. Card fees decrease and merchant fees increase as the interchange fee is raised. The
implication of the above assumption about bank competition is that the level of the interchange fee
aﬀects only the structure of fees, and not the overall level of fees: the sum of cardholder and merchant
fees per-transaction, denoted by l = f(a) + m(a), is independent of the interchange fee a (it equals
3In our set-up below this is also equivalent to assuming that the card association seeks to maximize the total number of
card transactions. Notably, MasterCard and Visa (the card associations) obtain revenues from a small levy on each card
transaction collected from their members, so they would seem to have the same incentives as their members.
4The form of card fees implies there is a one-to-one relationship between card fees and interchange fees.
3cA + cI + πA + πI). As a result, a card association will maximize its members’ proﬁts by choosing its
interchange fee to maximize its volume of card transactions.
As in Rochet and Tirole (2002), consumers get transactional or convenience beneﬁts bB from using
cards as opposed to the alternative cash, and merchants get transactional or convenience beneﬁts bS
from accepting cards relative to the alternative of accepting cash. The beneﬁts bB are drawn with a
positive density h(bB) over the interval [bB,bB]. The hazard function h(f)/(1 − H(f)) is assumed to be
increasing, where H denotes the cumulative distribution function corresponding to bB. All merchants
(sellers) are assumed to receive the same transactional beneﬁts bS from accepting cards (this assumption
will be relaxed later). We will refer to bB −f as the ‘surplus’ to consumers from using cards, and bS −m
as the ‘surplus’ to merchants from accepting cards. (Note, however, if merchants compete to attract
cardholders, they will also proﬁt from accepting cards through a business stealing eﬀect.) We assume
that
E(bB) + bS < l < bB + bS (3)
so as to rule out the possibility that there is no card use and to rule out the possibility that all consumers
use cards.
It costs merchants d to produce each good, and all goods are valued at v by all consumers. There
is a measure 1 of consumers who wish to buy from merchants. Consumers are assumed to each want to
purchase one good. We also assume




which is used in Appendix B to show that even monopolistic merchants will set a price such that consumers
who pay by cash will still want to purchase. Throughout, merchants are assumed to be unable to price
discriminate depending on whether consumers use cards or not, so consumers will want to pay with the
card if and only if bB ≥ f.5 Using this property, we can deﬁne a number of important functions. The
quasi-demand for card usage is deﬁned as D(f) = 1 − H(f), which is the proportion of consumers who
want to use cards at the fee f. The average convenience beneﬁt to those consumers using cards for a
transaction is β(f) = E[bB|bB ≥ f], which is increasing in f. The expected surplus to a consumer (buyer)
from being able to use their card at a merchant is
φB(f) = D(f)(β(f) − f), (4)
which is positive and decreasing in f. The expected surplus to a merchant (seller) from being able to
accept cards is D(f)(bS − m), which, given that f + m = l, can be deﬁned as
φS(f) = D(f)(f + bS − l). (5)
Finally, the expected joint surplus to consumers and merchants from card usage is deﬁned as
φ(f) = D(f)(β(f) + bS − l), (6)
which equals φB(f) + φS(f).
The following lemma summarizes some useful properties of these functions, and introduces three
important levels of the interchange fee.
5This no price discrimination assumption can be motivated by the no-surcharge rules that card associations have adopted
to prevent merchants from charging more to consumers for purchases made with cards. It can also be motivated by the
observation of price coherence (Frankel, 1998) — that merchants are generally reluctant to set diﬀerential prices depending
on the payment instrument used.





Notes. The interchange fee aM maximizes φS(f(a)), the expected surplus to a merchant from being able to
accept cards, while aC maximizes φ(f(a)), the expected joint surplus to consumers and merchants from card
usage. φS(f(a)) = 0 at the interchange fee aC, while φ(f(a)) = 0 at aΠ.
Lemma 1
1. There exists a unique interchange fee, denoted aC, which maximizes φ(f(a)). It equals
aC = bS − cA − πA (7)
and is the unique interchange fee which solves φS(f(a)) = 0.
2. There exists a unique interchange fee, denoted aM, which maximizes φS(f(a)).
3. There exists a unique interchange fee, denoted aΠ, which solves φ(f(a)) = 0.
4. The interchange fees aC, aM, and aΠ satisfy aM < aC < aΠ.
Proof. See Appendix A.1. ¥
The results of this lemma are summarized in Figure 1.
Each consumer enjoys some intrinsic beneﬁt, u, from holding a card, which is a random variable with
positive density e over the interval (−∞,u] for some u ≥ 0. We let A(u) = 1 − E(u), where E is the
cumulative distribution function for u. For some consumers u < 0, so that holding a card (which is not
used) is inconvenient. This could also represent the case that there are some costs to issuers associated
with managing a cardholder, if these costs are fully passed through to cardholders. For other consumers,
cards oﬀer more than just the ability to make transactions at merchants (for example, they may be used
as security or to withdraw cash), in which case u > 0. The variable λ captures the measure of consumers
who choose to hold a card.
The timing of the game is summarized as follows:
(i). The payment card association sets the level of its interchange fee a. Issuers and acquirers then set
fees f and m to cardholders and merchants according to (1) and (2). Alternatively, a proprietary
scheme sets f and m directly.
5(ii). Consumers get their draw of u and decide whether or not to hold the card. Merchants decide
whether or not to accept the card.
(iii). Merchants set their retail prices. If relevant, consumers decide which merchant to buy from.
(iv). Based on their individual realizations of bB, consumers decide whether to use the card for payment
(if they hold the card), or cash.
We ﬁrst start with the case of monopolistic merchants.
2.1 Monopolistic merchants
By considering monopolistic merchants, we abstract from the business stealing motive that can inﬂuence
a merchant’s card acceptance strategy. This non-strategic approach is the setting that underlies the
seminal analysis of Baxter (1983), in which he considered a merchant that accepted cards whenever the
transactional beneﬁts it obtained from doing so exceeded the merchant fee it was charged.
The following lemma describes the possible equilibria in stage (ii) of the game, and shows the Baxter
condition for card acceptance also applies here.
Lemma 2 Suppose a single card scheme has a card fee of f. If φS(f) < 0, then monopolistic merchants
reject the card and λ(f) = A(0) consumers hold the card. If φS(f) ≥ 0, then monopolistic merchants
accept the card, and λ(f) = A(−φB(f)) consumers hold the card.
Proof. We solve the game by working backwards through the stages. The stages are described in turn.
Stage (iv).
If consumers hold a card, they will use the card if bB ≥ f and the merchant they buy from accepts
the card and sets a price p ≤ v. If consumers hold a card, they will use the card if bB ≥ f +p−v and the
merchant they buy from accepts the card and sets a price p > v. In any other circumstance, consumers
will not use a card.
Stage (iii).
Provided it sets its price no higher than v, a merchant obtains proﬁt of
π = p − d + λ(f)D(f)(bS − m)I,
where I is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the merchant accepts the card and 0 otherwise.
Alternatively, a merchant can set p > v, in which case it will only sell to cardholders who use cards, so
that
π = λ(f)D(f + p − v)(p − d + bS − m)I.
As we prove in Appendix B, it will not be proﬁtable for a merchant to set a price above v, and exclude
‘cash customers’ (both those who do not hold a card and those who do not wish to use a card), provided
the surplus from the good itself is suﬃciently large. Instead, a monopolist will extract all the surplus
from the cash customers by setting p = v, implying it earns a proﬁt of
π = v − d + λ(f)φS(f)I.
Stage (ii).
Given a merchant obtains a price of v regardless of whether it accepts cards or not, it will accept
cards if and only if φS(f) ≥ 0. A consumer’s beneﬁt from holding the card is then φB(f)I +u. It follows
6that consumers will hold a card if u > 0 and φS(f) < 0 (using it only to withdraw cash and the like).
They will also hold a card if u > −φB(f) and φS(f) ≥ 0. If neither condition applies, consumers will not
hold a card. The equilibria in stage (ii) are thus those characterized by the lemma. ¥
The card scheme’s proﬁt (that is, the total proﬁt of the association’s member banks) is zero if φS(f) <
0, since merchants will not accept cards, and is equal to
Π(f) = (πA + πI)A(−φB(f))D(f)
if φS(f) ≥ 0. Then we have
Proposition 1 Facing monopolistic merchants, a single card scheme sets its interchange fee to solve
φS(f) = 0; that is, at a = aC.
Proof. A single card association maximizes Π(f) by choosing f to maximize A(−φB(f))D(f) subject to
the constraint φS(f) ≥ 0 which ensures merchants accept cards. The constraint is equivalent to f+bS ≥ l.
Since A(−φB(f))D(f) is decreasing in f and the left hand side of the constraint is increasing in f, this
implies the scheme will wish to set f as low as possible subject to the constraint. The constraint will be
binding and the proﬁt maximizing interchange fee solves φS(f) = 0, which from Lemma 1 is precisely
the interchange fee aC deﬁned in (7). ¥
The single card scheme sets an interchange fee which leaves merchants with no surplus from accepting
cards. This occurs when the fee charged to merchants equals the transactional beneﬁts they obtain. This
is also the (constrained) socially optimal level of the interchange fee, given monopolistic merchants. We
have:
Proposition 2 Facing monopolistic merchants, the welfare-maximizing interchange fee is a = aC.
Proof. See Appendix A.2. ¥
Although the unconstrained socially optimal interchange fee is higher than aC (it is bS − cA + πI, so
that consumers use cards whenever bB +bS > cI +cA), merchants will not accept cards if the interchange
fee is set above aC. The reason the interchange fee is too low here is that, facing stiﬀ merchant resistance
to accepting cards, the card scheme is unable to get merchants to absorb the issuers’ and acquirers’
margins. Instead, consumers who use cards will cover all of these margins, which leads to under-usage
of cards. The fact that some consumers can still get utility from holding cards (even if they cannot use
them) does not aﬀect this conclusion, since these consumers still get the same utility from holding cards
in the case they are able to use them.
In the limiting case of πA = πI → 0, the proﬁt maximizing interchange fee aC equal bS − cA, which
is also the Baxter interchange fee and the unconstrained socially optimal interchange fee.
2.2 Strategic merchants
In this section merchants may accept cards for strategic reasons, so as to attract customers from each
other. Like Rochet and Tirole (2002), we model this by assuming there are two merchants who compete
in a Hotelling fashion. In particular, consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit interval and the two
merchants are located at either extreme. A consumer located at x faces linear transportation costs of tx
from purchasing from merchant 1 and t(1 − x) from purchasing from merchant 2. These transportation
costs can be summarized by the function Ti(x) = tx(2 − i) + t(1 − x)(i − 1), where i = 1 corresponds
to merchant 1 and i = 2 corresponds to merchant 2. Note that the draws of u, x, and bB are all assumed
to be independent of one another.
7The following lemma describes the possible equilibria in stage (ii) of the game.
Lemma 3 Suppose a single card scheme has a card fee of f. If φ(f) < 0, then competing merchants
reject the card and λ(f) = A(0) consumers hold the card. If φ(f) ≥ 0, then competing merchants accept
the card and λ(f) = A(−φB(f)) consumers hold the card.
Proof. We solve the game by working backwards through time. The steps are described in turn.
Stage (iv).
Since consumers face the same price whether paying by card or by cash, they will only use the card
if bB ≥ f and the merchant they buy from accepts the card.
Stage (iii).
When deciding which merchant to buy from, consumers take into account their location in product
space (their exogenous preference for the two merchants), whether or not they hold a card, the price
charged by each merchant, and whether or not the merchants accept the card. A consumer located at x
who buys from merchant i obtains indirect utility equal to
vi = v − pi − Ti(x)
if they do not hold a card, and equal to
vi = v − pi + φB(f)Ii − Ti (x)
if they hold the card, where Ii is an indicator variable which takes the value 1 if merchant i accepts the







(p2 − p1 + λ(f)φB(f)(I1 − I2)), (8)
where λ(f) equals the measure of consumers holding cards given the card fee f. Firm 2 attracts a share
s2 = 1 − s1 of consumers. Merchant i’s proﬁt is
πi = si (pi − d − λ(f)D(f)(m − bS)Ii). (9)
We solve for the Nash equilibrium in this stage by working out each merchant’s proﬁt-maximizing choice of
prices given the share function (8). Solving these best responses simultaneously shows that the equilibrium
prices are
p1 = t + d + λ(f)D(f)I1 (m − bS) +
1
3
λ(f)φ(f)(I1 − I2), (10)
p2 = t + d + λ(f)D(f)I2 (m − bS) +
1
3
λ(f)φ(f)(I2 − I1). (11)










λ(f)φ(f)(I1 − I2) (13)
and s2 = 1 − s1.
Stage (ii).
In this stage we determine equilibria in the subgame as simultaneous solutions of each party’s best
response, conditional on the card fee and merchant fee set by the card scheme in stage (i).
8Merchants’ best responses.
To work out merchants’ optimal card acceptance policy we note that, regardless of what the other
merchant does, each merchant will accept cards if doing so increases its equilibrium market share. Thus,
each merchant will accept cards if doing so increases the function λ(f)φ(f), where the subscript for each
merchant has been dropped since the function is the same for both merchants. Note that here merchants’
card acceptance policy is determined by φ in the same way as it was determined by φS in Lemma 2.
Thus, following the identical proof of Lemma 2 but replacing φS with φ, we end up with exactly the same
results for merchant card acceptance, except with φS replaced by φ.
Consumers’ best responses.
Their choice of card-holding depends on the beneﬁts they get from holding a card, which depend on
merchants’ acceptance decisions. Given merchants are symmetric, the above result implies either both
merchants will accept cards, if φ(f) ≥ 0, or both merchants will reject cards. In this case we can deﬁne
I = I1 = I2. A consumer’s additional beneﬁt of holding the card is then φB(f)I +u. If merchants reject
the card (which happens when φ(f) < 0), then consumers will hold the card if and only if u ≥ 0. If
merchants accept the card (which happens when φ(f) ≥ 0), then consumers will hold the card if and
only if u ≥ −φB(f). The equilibria in stage (ii) are thus those characterized by the lemma. ¥
Notice from the proof above that card acceptance (that is, Ii = 1) does three things. First, it raises
the demand faced by merchant i. It provides consumers with a valuable option from shopping at the
merchant concerned, which is that they can use cards if doing so is convenient for them (bB > f). The
expected value of this option is measured by the term λ(f)φB(f) in the ﬁrm’s market share equation
(8). Second, and by symmetry, it lowers the demand faced by the rival ﬁrm. Thus, in this model card
acceptance has a business stealing eﬀect. Third, as the ﬁrm’s proﬁt equation (9) reveals, card acceptance
changes the merchant’s costs, increasing them if m > bS for the merchant concerned.
We are now ready to characterize equilibrium fee structures at stage (i) of the game. We consider the
proﬁt-maximizing interchange fee. The card scheme’s proﬁt is zero if φ(f) < 0, since no merchants will
accept cards, and equal to
Π(f) = (πA + πI)A(−φB(f))D(f)
if φ(f) ≥ 0. We have:
Proposition 3 Facing competing merchants, a single card scheme sets its interchange fee equal to aΠ,
so that φ(f(a)) = 0; that is, such that
β(f(aΠ)) + bS = l. (14)
Proof. Since πA + πI > 0, a single card association maximizes Π(f) by maximizing A(−φB(f))D(f)
subject to the constraint φ(f) ≥ 0 which ensures merchants accept cards. The constraint is equivalent
to β(f) + bS ≥ l. Since A(−φB(f))D(f) is decreasing in f and β(f) is increasing in f, this implies that
the card scheme’s proﬁt is maximized by setting f = fΠ, where β(fΠ) + bS = l and φ(fΠ) = 0. The
existence and uniqueness of the corresponding interchange fee aΠ was proven in Lemma 1. ¥
Condition (14) deﬁnes the merchant transactional beneﬁts bS, below which both merchants will not
accept cards and above which both merchants will accept cards. Interestingly, this is the same equilibrium
condition that Rochet and Tirole (2002) and Wright (2003a) obtained.6 A single card scheme sets a
6To be precise, in Rochet and Tirole’s model the term l on the right hand side is replaced by m. This diﬀerence only
arises because in their model the consumers’ fee f is eﬀectively a ﬁxed fee and so occurs regardless of the extent to which
the card is used. Moreover, Rochet and Tirole also found another equilibrium was possible in which merchants with values
of bS slightly above this critical level both reject cards, although they rule out this second equilibrium. In their model,
9fee structure which encourages maximal use of cards by consumers while ensuring merchants have just
enough surplus so that they will accept cards. Since merchants compete amongst themselves, they take
into account their customers’ average surplus from using cards in deciding whether to accept cards or
not. Thus, when the card scheme leaves merchants just indiﬀerent between accepting cards or not, it
implies that the expected joint surplus to consumers and merchants from the card scheme are exactly
zero.
As in Rochet and Tirole (2002), the welfare-maximizing interchange fee is either the same as the
privately chosen interchange fee set by a single scheme, or is lower.
Proposition 4 Facing competing merchants, the welfare-maximizing interchange fee is
aW = min
©
bS − cA + πI,aΠª
. (15)
Proof. See Appendix A.3. ¥
The unconstrained socially optimal interchange fee is the one at which consumers face the joint
costs of using cards less the transactional beneﬁts that merchants obtain. This requires a card fee of
f = cA + cI − bS. Since at this card fee consumers face the full social costs and beneﬁts of their card-
holding decision, including the cost or beneﬁt (u) simply from holding the card, there is no reason to
distort card fees in this model to encourage or discourage additional card-holding. The only reason then
to set a lower interchange fee is if this interchange fee implies merchants fees above which merchants
would accept cards. It is never optimal to exclude merchants and so get no card transactions.
3 Competition between identical card schemes
We modify the model of Section 2 by assuming there are two competing identical card systems. Identical
systems not only have the same costs and issuer and acquirer margins, they also provide the same beneﬁts
to cardholders and merchants. The only distinguishing feature of each card scheme is the fee structure it
chooses. Speciﬁcally, each card association i sets an interchange fee denoted ai.
Like the case with a single scheme, we follow Rochet and Tirole (2003, Section 6.2)7 and assume that
for competing card associations
fi(ai) = cI − ai + πI (16)
and
mi(ai) = cA + ai + πA, (17)
so that the interchange fee determines the structure but not the overall level of fees. Taking the limit
of the equilibrium fee structure as πI and πA tend to zero allows us to capture the case of perfect intra-
system competition.8 As before, we deﬁne l as the sum of f and m, which, from the fact that the issuers
and acquirers in each scheme are assumed to have the same costs and margins, does not depend on i.















each ﬁrm’s acceptance decision is aﬀected by what the other ﬁrm does. Due to our diﬀerent timing assumption, each ﬁrm’s
acceptance decision is independent of what other ﬁrms are doing, and so we get a unique equilibrium.
7See also Hausman et al. (2003).
8Like Rochet and Tirole (2003) we do not deal with issues of duality, in which banks may be members of both card
associations. See Hausman et al. (2003) for an analysis of duality. A further justiﬁcation for this form of bank fees is that
it can be used to recover the equilibrium fees that result from competition between two identical proprietary schemes, that
set their fees directly to consumers and merchants. Section 4.1 carries out this exercise.
10In stage (ii) consumers make their card-holding decision, which is now whether to hold none, one or
both cards. Likewise, in stage (ii) merchants now have to decide whether to accept none, one or both
cards. We let λi be the measure of consumers who hold card i only (singlehoming consumers), and λ12
be the measure of consumers who hold both cards (multihoming consumers).
We make use of two tie-breaking conventions. First, we assume if consumers are indiﬀerent about
holding one card or another, they will randomize to determine which card to hold. Second, we assume
that if merchants are indiﬀerent between accepting a card or not because they do not expect consumers
to use the card, they will accept the card if doing so would increase their proﬁts (or at least not decrease
their proﬁts) if some consumers did use the card.
The timing of the game is summarized as follows:
(i). Each payment card association sets the level of their interchange fee ai. Issuers and acquirers
then set fees fi and mi to cardholders and merchants according to (16) and (17). Alternatively, a
proprietary scheme i sets fi and mi directly.
(ii). Consumers decide which cards to hold (neither, one or both). Merchants decide whether to accept
cards (neither, one or both).
(iii). Merchants set their retail prices. If relevant, consumers decide which merchant to buy from.
(iv). Based on their individual realizations of bB, consumers decide whether to use cards or cash for
payment.
We start again with the case of monopolistic merchants, which, like the analysis of Rochet and
Tirole (2003), allows competition in two-sided markets to be analyzed without considering the strategic
interaction between sellers. Unlike Rochet and Tirole’s analysis of this problem, we ﬁrst consider the
consumers’ decisions about whether to hold none, one, or both cards, and assume all merchants get the
same beneﬁts from accepting cards.9
3.1 Monopolistic merchants
The following lemma describes the possible equilibria in stage (ii) of the game for any given card fees set
by the schemes in stage (i).
Lemma 4 Suppose two identical card schemes compete, with card schemes 1 and 2 having card fees f1
and f2 respectively.
1. If f1 = f2 then φ1
S = φ2
S and there are two cases to consider. If φ1
S = φ2
S ≥ 0, then monopolistic
merchants accept both cards and the singlehoming consumers will randomize over which card to
hold. If φ1
S = φ2
S < 0, then monopolistic merchants reject both cards and there are no singlehoming
consumers.
2. If fi < fj then four equilibria are possible at stage (ii). If φi
S,φ
j
S < 0, then monopolistic merchants
reject both cards and there are no singlehoming consumers. If φi
S,φ
j




then monopolistic merchants accept both cards and the singlehoming consumers will only hold card i.
If φi
S ≥ 0, φ
j
S < 0, then monopolistic merchants only accept card i and the singlehoming consumers
9In Section 4.2, we consider a case in which all consumers hold both cards and merchants are heterogenous, a case closer
to theirs.
11will only hold card i. If φ
j
S ≥ 0 and φi
S < 0 then monopolistic merchants only accept card j and the
singlehoming consumers will only hold card j. (If u > 0, then this equilibrium occurs more generally
if φ
j




Proof. We solve the game by working backwards through time.
Stage (iv).
To characterize consumers’ usage of cards, it is useful to introduce another indicator variable, L
j
i,
which captures the likelihood that, assuming they get a suﬃciently high draw of bB (that is bB ≥ fj),
consumers who hold both cards will prefer to use cards from scheme j at merchant i. For the case of
monopolistic merchants, the subscript i is redundant. We retain it here since it will become relevant for
the case of competing merchants considered in the next section. If f1 < f2 consumers will prefer to use
card 1 if merchants accept both cards (or just card 1), and will prefer to use card 2 if this is the only











if f1 < f2. If f1 > f2 consumers will prefer to use card 2 if merchants accept both cards (or just card











if f1 > f2. If f1 = f2 consumers will be indiﬀerent about which card to use if merchants accept both,
and so will randomize over card usage. If merchants only accept one card, then consumers prefer to use






















if f1 = f2.
Provided merchants set their common price p no higher than v, consumers will only use a card if the
transactional beneﬁts of doing so are at least as high as the fee they face. If consumers only hold card
i, they will only use the card if bB ≥ fi and the merchant they buy from accepts the card. The card
use of consumers who hold both cards and draw bB ≥ min{f1,f2} is described by equations (18), (19)
and (20). Alternatively, if merchants set their price above v, then if consumers only hold card i, they will
only use the card if bB + v ≥ fi + p and the merchant they buy from accepts the card. The card use of
consumers who hold both cards and draw bB ≥ min{f1,f2} + p − v is described by equations (18), (19)
and (20).
Stage (iii).
Given there is a measure 1 of potential consumers, provided a merchant sets its price less than or
equal to v in stage (iii), the merchant’s proﬁt is
π = p − d − λ1D1 ¡
m1 − bS
¢
I1 − λ2D2 ¡
m2 − bS
¢













f1 + p − v
¢¡
p − d + bS − m1¢
I1 + λ2D
¡
f2 + p − v
¢¡
p − d + bS − m2¢
I2
+λ12 ¡¡
f1 + p − v
¢¡
p − d + bS − m1¢
I1L1 + D
¡
f2 + p − v
¢¡
p − d + bS − m2¢
I2L2¢
.
As we show in Appendix B, it will not be proﬁtable for merchants to set a price above v, and exclude
‘cash customers’ (both those who do not hold a card and those who do not wish to use a card), provided
12the surplus from the good itself is suﬃciently large. Instead, merchants will extract all the surplus from
the cash customers by setting p = v, implying merchants earn a proﬁt of










In this stage we determine equilibria in the subgame as simultaneous solutions of each party’s best
response, conditional on the card fees and merchant fees set by the two card schemes in stage (i).
The merchant’s best response.
To work out a merchant’s optimal card acceptance policy we note that a merchant will accept cards
if doing so increases the function Ψ.
We must consider two possibilities for consumers’ card-holding. In the ﬁrst possibility we consider,
no consumers multihome, so that λ12 = 0 and the function Ψ is determined by the following table:
I2 = 0 I2 = 1
I1 = 0 0 λ2φ2
S




Recall that if a merchant is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting card i because it does not expect
consumers to use card i (so that accepting the card leaves the function Ψ unchanged), it will accept the
card if doing so increases Ψ when consumers do use card i. This is true if and only if φi
S ≥ 0. Merchants
therefore adopt the following policy: merchants reject both cards if φ1
S,φ2
S < 0, accept both cards if
φ1
S,φ2
S ≥ 0, and accept only card 1 (respectively, card 2) if φ1
S ≥ 0 > φ2
S (respectively, φ2
S ≥ 0 > φ1
S).
When all consumers hold at most one card, even though there are two card schemes, the condition that
determines whether merchants accept cards is identical to the case with a single card scheme. Each
individual merchant does not expect to be able to inﬂuence the number of cardholders of each type, and
so it acts as though these are two segmented groups of consumers.
The second possibility is that some consumers hold both cards, so that λ12 > 0. Since L1 and L2 in
equation (22) depend on the values of f1 and f2, we need to consider three diﬀerent cases.
• If f1 = f2 then φS = φ1
S = φ2
S and equation (20) implies that
Ψ = φS
¡
λ1I1 + λ2I2 + λ12 ¡
I1 + I2 − I1I2¢¢
.
In this case the function Ψ is determined by the following table:
I2 = 0 I2 = 1









λ1 + λ2 + λ12¢
φS
Merchants’ best response is to reject both cards if φS < 0 and to accept both cards if φS ≥ 0.
• If f1 < f2, then equation (18) implies that
Ψ = λ1φ1
SI1 + λ2φ2






13In this case the function Ψ is determined by the following table:
I2 = 0 I2 = 1















Merchants’ best response is as follows: merchants reject both cards if φ1
S,φ2
S < 0; they accept only
card 1 if φ2
S < 0 ≤ φ1
S; they accept only card 2 if φ2
S ≥ 0 and λ12φ2
S > (λ1 + λ12)φ1
S; and they
accept both cards if (λ1 + λ12)φ1
S ≥ λ12φ2
S ≥ 0.10
• Exploiting the symmetry with the above case, merchants’ best response is the same except the
superscripts 1 and 2 are swapped.
Consumers’ best responses.
At stage (ii), consumers decide which card(s) to hold, if any. Their choice of card-holding depends
on the beneﬁts they get from holding a card, which depend on merchants’ acceptance decisions. A
consumer’s additional beneﬁt of holding only card i is
φi
BIi + u,




If merchants reject both cards, then consumers with u ≥ 0 will hold two cards, while consumers with
u < 0 will hold no cards. If merchants accept only card i, then consumers will hold both cards if u ≥ 0,
will hold only card i if −φi
B ≤ u < 0 and will hold neither card if u < −φi
B. If merchants accept both
cards but card i has a lower card fee than the other card, then consumers will hold both cards if u ≥ 0,
will hold only card i if −φi
B ≤ u < 0 and will hold neither card if u < −φi
B. If merchants accept both
cards and both cards have the same card fees, then consumers will hold both cards if u ≥ 0, will hold
only a single card if −φ1
B = −φ2
B ≤ u < 0 (in which case consumers will randomize over which card they
will hold), and will hold neither card if u < −φ1
B = −φ2
B. These results are summarized by the functions
λ0(f1,f2) = 1 − A(−φ1
BL1 − φ2
BL2),






which give the measure of consumers who hold neither card, just card i, or both cards respectively. Note
if u = 0 then λ12 = 0 and no consumers multihome.
Equilibria in the subgame.
Using the characterizations of consumers’ and merchants’ best responses, we can look for cases where
both types of users have best responses to each other at stage (ii) — that is, we can look for possible
equilibria in the subgame starting at stage (ii). There are three cases to consider based on the relative
sizes of f1 and f2.
10Some of these results require a little thought. For example, consider the conditions required for accepting just card 1
to be optimal. If λ2 = 0 then this decision is optimal because the merchant is indiﬀerent between accepting only card 1
and accepting both cards (since consumers will never use card 2); the tie-breaking assumption means that the merchant
will reject card 2 in this circumstance (since φ2
S < 0). On the other hand, if λ2 > 0, then accepting only card 1 is optimal
because it leads to a higher value of Ψ than accepting both cards.
14Case 1: f1 = f2. In this case φ1
S = φ2
S. Then from above, an equilibrium in stage (ii) exists if φ1
S =
φ2
S ≥ 0. The merchant accepts both cards and the singlehoming consumers will randomize over
which card to hold. An equilibrium also exists in stage (ii) if φ1
S = φ2
S < 0, in which case the
merchant rejects both cards and there are no singlehoming consumers.
Case 2: f1 < f2. Then there are four possible equilibria at stage (ii). If φ1
S,φ2
S < 0, there is an equi-
librium in which the merchant rejects both cards and there are no singlehoming consumers. If
φ1
S,φ2
S ≥ 0 and (λ1 + λ12)φ1
S ≥ λ12φ2
S there is an equilibrium in which the merchant accepts both
cards and the singlehoming consumers will only hold card 1. If φ1
S ≥ 0, φ2
S < 0 there is an equi-
librium in which the merchant only accepts card 1 and the singlehoming consumers will only hold
card 1. If φ2
S ≥ 0 and φ1
S < 0 there is an equilibrium in which the merchant only accepts card 2
and the singlehoming consumers will only hold card 2. (If u > 0, then this equilibrium occurs more
generally if φ2
S ≥ 0 and φ1
S < φ2
S.)
Case 3: f1 > f2. By symmetry, this is the same as the above case except the superscripts 1 and 2 are
swapped.
¥
Note if there are some multihoming consumers (so λ12 > 0), there is the possibility of multiple
equilibria in the stage (ii) subgame. This happens if f1 < f2, φ1
S ≥ 0, φ2





S or if f1 > f2, φ1
S ≥ 0, φ2
S ≥ 0, λ12φ1
S > λ12φ2
S and (λ2 +λ12)φ2
S ≥ λ12φ1
S. The two
equilibria are (a) merchants accept both cards and singlehoming consumers will only hold the card with
lower card fees; and (b) merchants only accept the card with higher φS and the singlehoming consumers
will only hold this card. If monopolistic merchants could choose one of these equilibria, they would
choose the latter equilibrium. This maximizes their proﬁts in the subgame. Where there are multiple
equilibria, we select this equilibria in the subgame. An alternative possibility is to select the equilibria in
the subgame in which merchants accept both cards. In this case, there is no (pure-strategy) equilibrium
in the ﬁrst stage of the game.11
We start our analysis of stage (i) equilibria by considering the special case in which consumers never
want to hold both cards. This leads to the case of a ‘competitive bottleneck’.
3.1.1 Consumers hold at most one card
With the assumption that consumers get no intrinsic beneﬁt from holding cards (u = 0), we can see
from the characterization of consumers’ best responses at stage (ii) of the game that consumers will not
hold multiple cards. If merchants accept just one card, this is the card consumers will hold, while if
merchants accept both cards, singlehoming consumers will decide which is the best card to hold. Then
if both schemes set the same interchange fee (so φS ≡ φ1
S = φ2
S), merchants will accept both cards if
φS ≥ 0 and neither otherwise. When merchants accept both cards, card-holding consumers randomize
over which card to hold, and the members of such card schemes get (in aggregate) proﬁts of




11This follows because any scheme i can attract all users by slightly undercutting the other scheme’s interchange fee
(and so card fee), provided φi
S ≥ 0. This would cause schemes to compete by setting high interchange fees to the point
that φi
S = 0, at which point the other scheme can attract merchants exclusively by setting a slightly lower interchange fee
(higher card fee) given that some consumers will be holding both cards regardless of the fees.
15If card schemes act to maximize their joint proﬁts they will set their interchange fees so that φ1
S = φ2
S = 0,
which leads to the highest level of A(−φB(f))D(f) such that merchants still accept cards. This is the
interchange fee aC deﬁned in (7). We now show this is also the equilibrium outcome from competition
between the two identical schemes.
Proposition 5 If consumers get no intrinsic beneﬁt from holding cards, the equilibrium interchange
fee resulting from competition between identical card schemes facing monopolistic merchants equals aC;
that is, it solves φS(f(a)) = 0. Merchants will (just) accept both cards and card-holding consumers will
randomize over which card to hold. Each association shares in half the card transactions.
Proof. The existence of aC was proven in Lemma 1. The next step is to prove that this is an equilibrium
using our analysis of equilibria in the subgame starting at stage (ii). From the analysis of consumers’
best responses at stage (ii) of the game, with u = 0, λ12 = A(0) = 0. No consumers will hold both cards.
Note that at aC, φ1
S = φ2
S = 0. If scheme 1 sets a card fee f1 < f(aC), then φ1
S < φ2
S = 0, merchants will
accept only card 2 and no consumers will hold card 1; scheme 1 will get no card transactions. If scheme
1 sets a card fee f1 > f(aC) instead, then either φ1
S ≥ 0, in which case merchants accept both cards and
no consumers hold card 1, or φ1
S < 0, in which case merchants accept only card 2, and no consumers hold
card 1; in either case, scheme 1 will get no card transactions. Thus, this is indeed an equilibrium.
This equilibrium is unique, since if any scheme i sets a fee structure such that φi
S > 0, then the other
scheme will always want to attract all consumers to hold its card by setting a lower card fee such that
φ
j
S ≥ 0 and φ
j
S < φi
S. The optimal response of scheme i will be to match this fee structure. If any
scheme i sets a fee structure such that φi
S < 0, then merchants will reject its cards and the other scheme
will always want to attract all consumers to hold it cards by setting a fee structure at which merchants
will accept its cards (that is, with φ
j
S ≥ 0). The optimal response of scheme i will be to change its fee
structure so that φi
S ≥ 0. Thus, the only equilibrium is one with φi
S = φ
j
S = 0. ¥
Despite competition between identical schemes, they will each set their interchange fees as though
they are a single scheme maximizing card transactions (and proﬁts). When consumers hold only one card,
the eﬀect of competition between card schemes is to make it more attractive for each card scheme to lower
card fees to attract exclusive cardholders to their network. Cardholders provide each card scheme with a
bottleneck over a merchant’s access to these cardholders. Since with no merchant heterogeneity a single
scheme already sets the interchange fee to the point where merchants only just accept cards, there is no
scope to further lower fees to cardholders by raising merchants’ fees. Thus, despite competition between
the schemes, their fee structure is unchanged from the case of a single scheme. Armstrong (2002) calls this
situation a competitive bottleneck. Wright (2002) analyzes a similar competitive bottleneck that arises
in mobile phone termination. The welfare implications of this equilibrium are exactly as characterized in
Section 2.1. The socially optimal interchange fee is equal to aC.
As we will see in the next section, this competitive bottleneck situation is quite a special one. It
depends on the assumption that all consumers singlehome (hold just one card).
3.1.2 Some consumers hold both cards
Turning now to the case where some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards, the implications
of the resulting multihoming of consumers is dramatic. Rather than extracting all of the merchants’
surplus, identical card schemes will compete by setting their interchange fee to maximize φi
S, the ex-
pected surplus to merchants from accepting cards. The (pure-strategy) equilibrium interchange fee is
characterized in the following proposition.
16Proposition 6 If some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards, the equilibrium interchange
fee resulting from competition between identical card schemes facing monopolistic merchants equals aM,
which maximizes φi
S, the expected surplus to merchants from accepting cards. Merchants accept both cards
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Proof. The existence and uniqueness of aM was proven in Lemma 1. From the analysis of consumers’
best responses at stage (ii) of the game, λ12 = A(0) > 0. Some consumers will hold both cards. We
use this property and the analysis of equilibria in the stage (ii) subgame to show that aM represents an
equilibrium interchange fee.
Any scheme (say scheme 1) that sets a higher card fee f1 (lower interchange fee), will result in φ1
S < φ2
S,
so will imply an equilibrium at stage (ii) in which merchants accept both cards and the singlehoming
consumers will only hold card 2. The measure of each type of consumer λN, λS and λM will not change
since singlehoming consumers will get the same beneﬁts from holding card 2, as previously they obtained
from randomizing over which card to hold. Scheme 1 will get no card transactions.
Any scheme (say scheme 1) that sets a lower fee f1 (higher interchange fee), will result in φ1
S < φ2
S, so
will imply an equilibrium at stage (ii) in which merchants will only accept card 2 and the singlehoming
consumers will only hold card 2. Again, the measure of each type of consumer will not change since
singlehoming consumers will get the same beneﬁts from holding card 2, as previously they obtained from
randomizing over which card to hold. Again, scheme 1 will get no card transactions.
Thus, scheme 1 does strictly worse by setting a higher or lower interchange fee than that which
maximizes φS, proving that this is an equilibrium.
It remains to prove that this equilibrium is unique. Suppose that it is not. Then there exists some
other equilibrium in which one scheme (say scheme 1) sets an interchange fee such that φ1
S < φmax
S .
It is straightforward to show that scheme 2’s best response is to set a diﬀerent interchange fee so that
φ2
S > φ1
S, in which case it attracts all card transactions. Thus, there can be no other equilibrium. ¥
In equilibrium, both schemes set their interchange fee at the level aM, and merchants accept both
schemes’ cards. This maximizes the expected surplus to merchants from accepting cards. Competition
drives cards schemes to oﬀer the maximal proﬁt to merchants from card acceptance, in an attempt to have
their card accepted exclusively, thus obtaining all card transactions. In equilibrium each card scheme
shares equally in the card transactions.
The equilibrium interchange fee aM can be compared to the interchange fee that maximizes the
schemes’ joint proﬁts when merchants are monopolists — the interchange fee aC deﬁned in (7).
Proposition 7 When some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards, the equilibrium inter-
change fee resulting from competition between identical card schemes facing monopolistic merchants leads
to an interchange fee lower than that which maximizes the schemes’ joint proﬁt (or joint card transac-
tions).
17Proof. The result aM < aC was proven in Lemma 1. ¥
Since aC is also the constrained socially optimal interchange fee for the case with monopolistic mer-
chants, the competitive interchange fee here must be below the socially optimal interchange fee, even in
the limit case πA = πI → 0.
Proposition 8 When some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards, the equilibrium inter-
change fee resulting from competition between identical card schemes facing monopolist merchants leads
to an interchange fee lower than that which maximizes overall welfare.
Proof. See Appendix A.4. ¥
By taking into account only the interests of one side of the market (merchants), the interests of the
other side (consumers) are ignored. This results in card fees that are set too high and merchant fees that
are set too low.
3.2 Strategic merchants
We now move to the case of competing card schemes and competing merchants. The analysis follows
directly from that of monopolistic merchants. The main diﬀerence is that competing merchants accept
cards to attract business from each other, so that attracting merchants now involves taking into account
the surplus oﬀered to their customers as well.
We ﬁrst characterize equilibria at the stage (ii) subgame in which consumers decide which card(s) to
hold and merchants decide which card(s) to accept.
Lemma 5 Suppose two identical card schemes compete, with card schemes 1 and 2 having card fees f1
and f2 respectively.
1. If f1 = f2 then φ1 = φ2 and there are two cases to consider. If φ1 = φ2 ≥ 0, then competing
merchants will accept both cards and the singlehoming consumers will randomize over which card
to hold. If φ1 = φ2 < 0, then competing merchants reject both cards and there are no singlehoming
consumers.
2. If fi < fj then four equilibria are possible at stage (ii). If φi,φj < 0, then competing merchants
reject both cards and there are no singlehoming consumers. If φi,φj ≥ 0 and (λi + λ12)φi ≥ λ12φj,
then competing merchants will accept both cards and the singlehoming consumers will only hold
card i. If φi ≥ 0, φj < 0, then competing merchants will only accept card i and the singlehoming
consumers will only hold card i. If φj ≥ 0 and φi < φj, then competing merchants will only accept
card j and the singlehoming consumers will only hold card j.
Proof. We solve the game by working backwards through time.
Stage (iv).
As in Lemma 4, if consumers only hold card i, they will only use the card if bB ≥ fi and the
merchant they buy from accepts the card. The card use of consumers who hold both cards and draw
bB ≥ min{f1,f2} is described by equations (18), (19) and (20).
Stage (iii).
Consumers take into account the price charged by each merchant when deciding which merchant to
buy from, as well as their location in product space (their exogenous preference for the two merchants),
18whether they hold each of the cards, and whether the merchants accept each of the cards. A consumer
located at x who buys from merchant i obtains indirect utility equal to
vi = v − pi − Ti(x)
if they hold neither card, equal to




i − Ti (x)
if they just hold card j, and equal to






i − Ti (x)





































while ﬁrm 2 attracts s2 = 1 − s1 of the consumers.
The next step is to determine the merchants’ equilibrium prices conditional on the cards held by
consumers and the cards accepted by merchants. Merchant i’s proﬁt is
πi = si
³























We solve for the Nash equilibrium in this stage by working out each merchant’s proﬁt-maximizing choice
of prices given the share function (23). Solving these best responses simultaneously implies that the
equilibrium price pi is
pi =t + d + λ1D1I1
i (m1 − bS) + λ2D2I2
i (m2 − bS) + λ12(D1I1
i L1




















Substituting (25) into (24) and simplifying terms, it can be shown that ﬁrm i earns an equilibrium proﬁt



































and s2 = 1 − s1.
Stage (ii).
In this stage we determine equilibria in the subgame as simultaneous solutions of each party’s best
response, conditional on the card fees and merchant fees set by the two card schemes in stage (i).
Merchants’ best responses.
To work out merchants’ optimal card acceptance policy we note that, regardless of what the other
merchant does, each merchant will accept cards if doing so increases its equilibrium market share. Thus,
each merchant will accept cards if doing so increases the function
Φ = λ1φ1I1 + λ2φ2I2 + λ12 ¡
φ1I1L1 + φ2I2L2¢
, (27)
where the subscript for each merchant has been dropped since the function is the same for both merchants.
Note that here merchants’ card acceptance policy is determined by Φ in the same way as it was determined
19by Ψ in Lemma 4. Thus, following the identical proof of Lemma 4 but replacing φi
S with φi, we end up
with exactly the same results, except with φi
S replaced by φi. ¥
As was the case for monopolistic merchants, if there are some multihoming consumers, multiple
equilibria in the stage (ii) subgame are possible. The analysis of these multiple equilibria parallels that
with monopolistic merchants where φi
S is replaced by φi. With competing merchants, we select the
equilibria in the subgame that consumers and merchants would choose if they got together to choose
one. As before, an equilibrium in the full game does not exist if the other equilibrium is selected in the
subgame.
One interesting implication of Lemma 5 is that individual merchants will not necessarily prefer the
card scheme with the lowest merchant fee. Individual merchants also care about the fees consumers will
face from using cards (if cards are beneﬁcial for merchants, they will want consumers to use them more),
and the beneﬁts consumers obtain from using cards (reﬂecting the fact that this allows merchants to
attract more customers by accepting cards). Both aspects are combined in the function φ.
We start our analysis of stage (i) equilibria by considering the special case in which consumers never
want to hold both cards. Like the case with monopolistic merchants, this results in a competitive
bottleneck. Despite competition between schemes, each scheme sets its interchange fee at the same level
as that set by a single monopolist scheme.
3.2.1 Consumers hold at most one card
Given Lemma 5 parallels the results of Lemma 4 with φi
S replaced by φi, in the case consumers get no
intrinsic beneﬁt from holding cards (u = 0), Proposition 5 becomes:
Proposition 9 If consumers get no intrinsic beneﬁt from holding cards, the equilibrium interchange fee
resulting from competition between identical card schemes facing competing merchants equals aΠ; that is,
it solves φ(f(a)) = 0. Merchants will (just) accept both cards and card-holding consumers will randomize
over which card to hold. Each association shares in half the card transactions.
Proof. The existence of aΠ was proven in Lemma 1. The next step is to prove that this is an equilibrium
using our analysis of equilibria in the subgame starting at stage (ii). From the analysis of consumers’
best responses at stage (ii) of the game, with u = 0, λ12 = A(0) = 0. No consumers will hold both cards.
Note that at aΠ, φ1 = φ2 = 0. The rest of the proof follows identically to the proof of Proposition 5,
except with φS replaced by φ everywhere. ¥
Again we have the case of a competitive bottleneck. Thus, despite competition between the schemes,
their fee structure is unchanged from the case of a single scheme facing competing merchants. The
welfare implications of this equilibrium are exactly as characterized by Proposition 4. The socially optimal
interchange fee is either equal to aΠ or is lower.
3.2.2 Some consumers hold both cards
In this case we allow some consumers to obtain positive intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards (so u > 0).
As with monopolistic merchants, the implication for card scheme competition of this multihoming is
dramatic.
Proposition 10 When some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards, the equilibrium inter-
change fee resulting from competition between identical card schemes facing competing merchants equals
20aC, which maximizes φi, the expected joint surplus to consumers and merchants from using cards. Mer-
chants accept both cards and singlehoming consumers randomize over which card to hold. The measure




the measure of consumers not holding cards is
λN ¡
aC¢
= 1 − A(−φB (l − bS)),
and the measure of singlehoming consumers is
λS ¡
aC¢
= A(−φB (l − bS)) − A(0).
Proof. Lemma 1 proved there exists a unique interchange fee aC which maximizes φi. From the analysis
of consumers’ best responses at stage (ii) of the game, λ12 = A(0) > 0. Some consumers will hold
both cards. We use this property and the analysis of equilibria in the stage (ii) subgame to show that
aC represents an equilibrium interchange fee. The rest of the proof follows identically to the proof of
Proposition 6, except with φS replaced by φ everywhere. ¥
In equilibrium, both schemes set their interchange fee at the level aC, and merchants will accept
both schemes’ cards. The equilibrium involves merchants controlling which card is used by choosing
which card to accept. Competition drives cards schemes to oﬀer maximal proﬁt to merchants, in an
attempt to have their cards accepted exclusively, thus obtaining all card transactions. Since merchants
compete amongst themselves, they take into account consumers’ average surplus from using cards, so that
competition between card schemes to attract merchants results in card schemes maximizing the expected
joint surplus of end users (the expected joint net transactional beneﬁts to consumers and merchants from
using cards). In equilibrium each card scheme shares equally in the card transactions.
These interchange fees can be compared to the interchange fee that maximizes the schemes’ joint
proﬁts — the interchange fee aΠ deﬁned in equation (14).
Proposition 11 When some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards, the equilibrium inter-
change fee resulting from competition between identical card schemes facing competing merchants leads to
an interchange fee lower than that which maximizes the schemes’ joint proﬁt (or joint card transactions).
Proof. The result aC < aΠ was proven in Lemma 1. ¥
Thus, competition between card schemes results in an equilibrium in which card schemes are jointly
worse oﬀ, as there are fewer total card transactions compared to the case without competition. A more
interesting comparison is whether the competitive interchange fee is higher or lower than the welfare
maximizing interchange fee.
Proposition 12 When some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards, the equilibrium inter-
change fee resulting from competition between identical card schemes facing competing merchants leads
to an interchange fee lower than that which maximizes overall welfare.
Proof. See Appendix A.5. ¥
Competing card schemes end up setting an ineﬃciently low interchange fee. They charge merchants
too little, and cardholders too much. Despite the fact competing schemes maximize the expected surplus
of end users, the competing card schemes set card fees too high from an eﬃciency perspective. They
pass on their margins πA + πI to cardholders, resulting in a distortion in the fees faced by consumers.
21Table 1: Summary of results
Single scheme Competing Schemes Social Planner Relationships
u ≤ 0 u > 0
Monopoly a∗ = aC a∗∗
− = aC a∗∗
+ = aM aW = aC a∗∗
+ < aW = a∗ = a∗∗
−
Hotelling a∗ = aΠ a∗∗
− = aΠ a∗∗
+ = aC aW a∗∗
+ < aW ≤ a∗ = a∗∗
−
Notes. a∗ is the interchange fee which a single card scheme would choose, a∗∗
− is the equilibrium interchange
fee resulting from competition between identical schemes when consumers hold at most one card, a∗∗
+ is the
equilibrium interchange fee resulting from competition between identical schemes when some consumers hold
both cards, and aW is the welfare-maximizing interchange fee.
When interchange fees are increased by the margins πA + πI, consumers will use cards if and only if
the joint surplus exceeds the joint cost (eﬃcient usage), while merchants will still accept cards (provided
β(f)−f ≥ πA+πI). Only in the limit as πA = πI → 0 will equilibrium fees be set at the socially optimal
level. In this case aC = bS − cA and m = bS. This is the interchange fee that Baxter found was optimal
— it ensures cards are only used when the joint surplus exceeds joint cost.
3.3 Summarizing results
Our results are summarized in Table 1. With both forms of merchant behavior considered, when con-
sumers only hold one card, competition between card schemes does not result in lower interchange fees.
In this case, by attracting cardholders, card schemes have a monopoly over access to these cardholders.
This leads competing card schemes to care only about the surplus they can oﬀer to cardholders, leaving
no surplus to merchants (the case of a competitive bottleneck). This competitive bottleneck outcome can
be undermined provided some consumers hold both cards. Then the unique equilibrium involves compet-
ing card schemes seeking to attract merchants exclusively by oﬀering maximal incentive for merchants
to accept their cards. In the case of a monopoly merchant, this implies maximizing the expected surplus
oﬀered to merchants. In the case of competing merchants, this involves maximizing the expected joint
surplus of consumers and merchants, given that competing merchants take into account the beneﬁt that
their customers get from being able to use cards. In either case, interchange fees are lower as a result of
competition between the card schemes.12
Interchange fees are also lower when there is a monopoly merchant rather than competing merchants.
This is true both for the case without scheme competition (because aC < aΠ) and for the case with
scheme competition (because aM < aC). When merchants compete amongst themselves, card schemes
will charge more to merchants and less to cardholders. Competition between merchants makes them less
resistant to accepting cards, as card acceptance becomes a strategic device to attract customers. In this
case, the business stealing eﬀect can be responsible for ineﬃciently high merchant fees (and low card
fees), while competition between schemes can be responsible for ineﬃciently low merchant fees (and high
card fees). When the two eﬀects are combined, so there is competition between schemes and between
merchants, the equilibrium interchange fee turns out to be the same as the case without competition
between schemes and without competition between merchants. The two types of competition exactly
oﬀset, and the resulting interchange fee is still ineﬃciently low, but only to the extent that issuers and
12Proposition 7 implies aM < aC for the monopoly merchant case, and Proposition 11 implies aC < aΠ for the competing
merchants case.
22acquirers obtain positive margins.13
4 Extensions and implications
In Section 4.1 we consider what our analysis implies about competition between proprietary schemes
such as American Express and Discover Card. Section 4.2 discusses some implications of merchant
heterogeneity. Section 4.3 examines how the existence of cash-constrained consumers aﬀects results.
Some policy implications are discussed in Section 4.4, while Section 4.5 considers what our analysis
suggests about competition in some other two-sided markets.
4.1 Competing proprietary schemes
In Section 3 we considered the case of competition between card associations, each of which sets an
interchange fee to achieve its desired fee structure. It is also straightforward to determine what two
competing proprietary schemes, which set the fees f and m directly, will do. Note that the proﬁt of
proprietary card scheme i is
Πi = (fi + mi − cA − cI)Ti, (28)
where Ti is the number of card transactions on system i.
In the cases we have considered, the results easily extend to two competing proprietary schemes. In
each case, the analysis from stage (ii) onwards is the same as before since this assumed the fees fi and
mi were taken as given. At stage (i) any equilibrium involving competition between identical proprietary
schemes will involve the sum of their fees f+m being driven down to cost cA+cI. Out of all fee structures
that satisfy these constraints, only the structure of fees characterized in Section 3 will be equilibria. The
equilibrium fees in the case of competing proprietary schemes then correspond to those implied by the
interchange fees resulting from Section 3 in the limit as πA = πI → 0. We therefore get
Proposition 13 If consumers get no intrinsic beneﬁt from holding cards (consumers singlehome), the
equilibrium fees resulting from competition between identical proprietary schemes facing monopolistic
merchants are characterized by f∗ = cA + cI − bS and m∗ = bS.
Proposition 14 If some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards (consumers multihome),
the equilibrium fees resulting from competition between identical proprietary schemes facing monopolistic
merchants are characterized by
h(f∗)(f∗ + bS − cA − cI) = D(f∗)
and m∗ = cA + cI − f∗.
Proposition 15 If consumers get no intrinsic beneﬁt from holding cards (consumers singlehome), the
equilibrium fees resulting from competition between identical proprietary schemes facing competing mer-
chants are characterized by β(f) = cA + cI − bS and m∗ = cA + cI − f∗.
Proposition 16 If some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards (consumers multihome),
the equilibrium fees resulting from competition between identical proprietary schemes facing competing
merchants are characterized by f∗ = cA + cI − bS and m∗ = bS.
13While this exact oﬀset is likely to be a speciﬁc feature of our model, the presence of the two oﬀsetting eﬀects should be
more general.
23The ﬁrst and fourth case correspond exactly to the socially optimal set of fees. In the second case, card
fees are set too high and merchant fees too low. In the third case, card fees are set too low and merchant
fees too high. These results are no diﬀerent from the case of competing identical card associations in the
limit as intra-platform competition drives issuing and acquiring margins to zero.
4.2 Merchant heterogeneity
In this section we follow Wright (2003a) and consider the case in which there are many industries, each
of which has a diﬀerent value of bS (in some industries, being able to accept cards is more useful than
in others). The random variable bS is drawn with a positive density g(bS) over the interval [bS,bS],
and a cumulative distribution denoted G. Apart from this form of heterogeneity, industries are all alike.
The particular draws of bS are assumed to be unobserved by the card schemes, and are assumed to be
independent of all the other draws. Consumers are exogenously matched to all the diﬀerent industries,
and so without loss of generality they buy one good from each industry. The merchants’ (sellers’) “quasi-
demand” function which measures the proportion of merchants with transactional beneﬁts above some
level bS is denoted S(bS) = 1 − G(bS). The timing is the same as in the benchmark model.
We start by considering the case with a single card scheme and a monopoly merchant in each indus-
try.14 From Lemma 2, a monopolist merchant will reject the card if φS(f) < 0 and will accept a card
if φS(f) ≥ 0. Recall φS(f) = D(f)(f + bS − l), so that merchants with bS ≥ l − f will accept cards
and others will not. There are therefore S (l − f) = 1 − G(l − f) merchants that accept cards.15 A
consumer’s beneﬁt from holding the card is then φB(f)S (l − f) + u, since a consumer gets an expected
surplus of φB(f) from using their card at each merchant, and there are S (l − f) merchants that accept
cards. The term u is the consumer’s intrinsic beneﬁt of holding a card. It follows that consumers will
hold a card if u > −φB(f)S (l − f), and not otherwise.
The card scheme’s proﬁt (that is, the total proﬁt of the association’s member banks) is then equal to
Π(f) = (πA + πI)A(−φB(f)S (l − f))D(f)S (l − f),
since there are A(−φB(f)S (l − f)) consumers holding a card and each of them will use their card a
proportion D(f) of the time at a measure S (l − f) of merchants. Then a single card scheme sets an
interchange fee (or equivalently a card fee) to maximize Π(f). This fee does not aﬀord any useful
interpretation.
As the above case demonstrates, it is diﬃcult to obtain general results on the equilibrium interchange
fee under merchant heterogeneity. This diﬃculty is heightened when there is also competition between
payment schemes. One case which does aﬀord a general interpretation under scheme competition is that
in which all consumers hold at most one card. In this case we continue to get the competitive bottleneck
outcome found without merchant heterogeneity. Schemes will compete by seeking to attract cardholders
exclusively, and access to these cardholders becomes the bottleneck for merchants. However, unlike the
case with homogenous merchants, the competitive bottleneck now results in competing schemes setting
interchange fees that are too high, even from their own perspective.
We ﬁrst characterize the equilibrium at stage (ii) in the game.
14In each case below, we note how the analysis changes when merchants compete in a Hotelling fashion.
15For the case with competing merchants in each industry, the condition for merchant acceptance φS(f) ≥ 0 is replaced
by the condition φ(f) ≥ 0. This implies f is replaced by β(f) in the function G below, and the function S below will change
as a result. Other than this one modiﬁcation, the analysis is unchanged in what follows.
24Lemma 6 Suppose two identical card schemes compete, with card schemes 1 and 2 having card fees f1




merchants accept card i, and consumers hold card i if φi
BSi > φ
j
BSj and u ≥ −φi
BSi, will randomize
over which card to hold if φi
BSi = φ
j
BSj and u ≥ −φi
BSi, and will not hold card i otherwise.
Proof. Working back to stage (ii), a merchant’s proﬁt from accepting cards is identical to the case of
a single merchant, for a given number of cardholders and given fees (that is, the analysis is identical to
Lemma 4). Given no consumers hold both cards, merchants adopt the following policy: the merchant
rejects both cards if φ1
S,φ2
S < 0, it accepts both cards if φ1
S,φ2
S ≥ 0, and it accepts only card 1 (respectively,
card 2) if φ1
S ≥ 0 > φ2
S (respectively, φ2
S ≥ 0 > φ1
S). This implies merchants with bS ≥ l − fi will accept
card i, and others will not accept card i, so that there are Si = 1−G
¡
l − fi¢
merchants that accept card
i. A consumer’s additional beneﬁt of holding just card i is
φi
BSi + u.
As a result, consumers will all hold the card with highest value of φi
BSi provided u ≥ −φi
BSi, will
randomize over which card to hold if φi
BSi = φ
j
BSj and u ≥ −φi
BSi, and will not hold card i otherwise.
¥
When consumers hold at most one card, competing schemes will seek to have their card held exclusively
by consumers. This gives them a bottleneck over access to these consumers by merchants. If merchants
want their customers to be able to use cards, then from the perspective of the merchant each card scheme
(with its exclusive set of cardholders) is like a monopoly supplier. Then if both schemes set the same
interchange fee (so φS ≡ φ1
S = φ2
S), the merchants accept both cards if φS ≥ 0 and neither otherwise.
When the merchant accepts both cards, card-holding consumers randomize over which card to hold, and
the members of such card schemes get (in aggregate) proﬁts of
Π1 = Π2 = (πI + πA)
A(−φB(f)S (l − f))D(f)S (l − f)
2
.
If card schemes act to maximize their joint proﬁts, they will set their interchange fees so as to maximize
A(−φB(f)S(l − f))D(f)S(l − f). This implies the same interchange fee as we found for the case with
a single scheme. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium interchange fees arising from
competition between schemes.
Proposition 17 If consumers hold at most one card, the equilibrium interchange fee resulting from com-
petition between identical card schemes facing monopolistic merchants is that which maximizes consumers’
expected surplus from holding a card φB(f)S (l − f). At these interchange fees, a merchant that accepts
one card will accept both cards and card-holding consumers will randomize over which card to hold. Each
association shares in half the card transactions.
Proof. If any scheme sets a lower or higher card fee f, it will no longer get any cardholders and therefore
any card transactions. This equilibrium is unique since if any scheme i sets a fee structure such that
φB(f)S (l − f) is not maximized, then a single scheme can always adjust f to oﬀer more to consumers
from holding its card, which will result in its card being held exclusively. ¥
The expected surplus from holding a card is the product of φB(f), the expected surplus a cardholder
obtains from being able to use the card for a purchase, and S(l − f), the proportion of merchants that
accept cards. The expected surplus a cardholder obtains from being able to use their card for a purchase
can be further broken down into the product of β(f)−f, the surplus they obtain from using a card for a
25purchase, and D(f), the proportion of times the consumer would want to use a card for a purchase. Thus,
the expected surplus which the card schemes will attempt to maximize can be expressed as the product of
the surplus from using a card for a purchase and D(f)S (l − f), the number of transactions using cards.
Since a single scheme (or two schemes acting jointly) will maximize member proﬁts by maximizing the
number of transactions using cards, competing schemes will set a higher interchange fee (and lower card
fee) if doing so raises the surplus to consumers from using cards for a purchase. We thus get that16
Proposition 18 If β(f) − f is decreasing in f, then the equilibrium interchange fee resulting from
competition between identical card schemes when consumers hold at most one card cannot be below the
joint proﬁt maximizing interchange fee.
Proof. Suppose both schemes set interchange fees at a∗, the equilibrium interchange fee resulting
from competition between identical schemes, which maximizes φB(f)S (l − f). This interchange fee
also maximizes A(−φB(f)S (l − f))φB(f)S (l − f), since A is a monotonically decreasing function. This
can be rewritten as θ(f) = (β(f) − f)T(f), where T(f) = A(−(β(f) − f)D(f)S (l − f))D(f)S(l − f)
is proportional to the joint proﬁt of the two schemes. It follows that
θ(f) ≤ θ(f∗) ∀ f ≤ f∗.
Since β(f) − f is decreasing in f for all f, then
β(f) − f ≥ β(f∗) − f∗ ∀ f ≤ f∗.






β(f∗) − f∗ = T(f∗) ∀ f ≤ f∗.
Therefore argmaxf T(f) ≥ f∗ and the joint proﬁt maximizing interchange fee cannot be above the
equilibrium interchange fee a∗. ¥
The intuition behind the result is simple. Holding constant the fraction of cardholders on each scheme,
card schemes will maximize their respective proﬁts by acting as though they do not face any competition.
The market is eﬀectively segmented. At this point, a small change in a scheme’s interchange fee will
have only a second order impact on the number of card transactions. However, a small increase in a
scheme’s interchange fee will have a ﬁrst order impact on the average surplus consumers get from using
cards. If the average surplus to those using cards increases when the interchange fee is increased above a∗,
each card scheme will set interchange fees too high in an attempt to get consumers to switch to holding
their card exclusively, an eﬀect which ends up reducing the total number of card transactions and their
members’ proﬁts.17
We can contrast the above case in which consumers hold at most one card to the case in which all
consumers (that is, measure 1) hold both cards (which would arise if u > 0 for all consumers). We
continue to assume all merchants are monopolists. Given consumers hold both cards, we only need to
solve at stage (ii) for merchants’ optimal decision for card acceptance. From Lemma 4, it follows that
Lemma 7 Suppose two identical card schemes compete, with card schemes 1 and 2 having card fees f1
and f2 respectively. Suppose consumers hold both cards.
16An earlier version of this paper (Guthrie and Wright, 2003) demonstrates the same result holds for the case in which
merchants compete in a Hotelling fashion.
17The condition in Proposition 18 is satisﬁed if the consumer quasi-demand for card use is linear (bB follows the uniform
distribution). Then β(f) − f = (bB − f)/2, so that β(f) − f is decreasing in f.
261. If f1 = f2 then φ1
S = φ2
S and there are two cases to consider. If φ1
S = φ2
S ≥ 0, then monopolistic
merchants accept both cards. If φ1
S = φ2
S < 0, then monopolistic merchants reject both cards.
2. If fi < fj then four equilibria are possible at stage (ii). If φi
S,φ
j
S < 0, then monopolistic merchants
reject both cards. If φi
S,φ
j
S ≥ 0 and φi
S ≥ φ
j
S, then monopolistic merchants accept both cards (but
only card i gets used). If φi
S ≥ 0, φ
j






S, then monopolistic merchants only accept card j.
Proof. Given u > 0 for all consumers, all consumers will hold both cards to obtain the instrinsic beneﬁts
of the cards (as well as to obtain any usage beneﬁts). Working back to stage (ii), a merchant’s proﬁt
from accepting cards is identical to the case of a single merchant, for a given number of cardholders and
given fees. The results then follow directly from applying Lemma 4 when all consumers hold both cards.
¥
Turning now to competition between schemes at stage (i), identical card schemes will compete by
setting their interchange fee to attract merchants. We consider two cases. With equal interchange fees,
consumers randomize over which card to use, and each card scheme receives half the card transactions.
Lemma 7 implies scheme proﬁts are
Π1 = Π2 = (πI + πA)
D(f)S (l − f)
2
.





For industries with bS > l − b(f1,f2), merchants will accept cards from both schemes (but only card
2 will be used). Only merchants with high transactional beneﬁts of accepting cards will be willing to
accept the more expensive card knowing consumers will always use it. Merchants with bS between l−f1
and l − b(f1,f2) will only accept cards from scheme 1, the cheaper card to accept. Merchants with yet
lower transactional beneﬁts of accepting cards will not accept either card. Scheme 1’s proﬁt is thus










while scheme 2’s proﬁt is





A symmetric equilibrium in which both schemes set the same interchange fee a∗ (and therefore the same
card fee f∗) requires that











for any fee f1 > f∗, and






for any fee f1 < f∗. The nature of the equilibrium, if any, depends on the speciﬁc distributions on bB and
bS. A case in which there is an explicit solution is the case in which bB and bS are distributed uniformly
(so that quasi-demand functions are linear).
Proposition 19 If consumers hold both cards and quasi-demand functions are linear, the equilibrium
interchange fee resulting from competition between identical card schemes facing monopolistic merchants









bB − cI − πI
¢
.
18The case in which it sets a higher interchange fee follows by symmetry.
27Proof. A symmetric equilibrium in which both schemes set the same interchange fee a∗ requires that












for any lower interchange fee (so f1 > f∗) and







for any higher interchange fee (so f1 < f∗).








Now consider the limit of scheme 1’s proﬁts as its interchange fee approaches the proposed symmetric






















2bB − bS + l
¢
.
Alternatively, consider the limit of scheme 1’s proﬁt as its interchange fee approaches the proposed
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is independent of f1. Alterna-

























28To see why there are no asymmetric equilibria, note that if scheme 1 sets a lower interchange fee than

















is independent of f1. This is
true regardless of ﬁrm 2’s interchange fee. Thus, scheme 1 will always want to set its interchange fee as
close as possible to scheme 2’s interchange fee (that is, an inﬁnitesimal amount less than a2). Clearly
there can be no asymmetric equilibrium. ¥
The equilibrium above can be compared to the joint proﬁt maximizing and socially optimal interchange
fees. If the schemes maximize their joint proﬁts given all consumers hold both cards, they will set a
common interchange fee to maximize
(πI + πA)D(f)S (l − f),
while a social planner will set the interchange fee to maximize
(βB(f) + βS (l − f) − cA − cI)D(f)S (l − f).
Given the assumption of a linear quasi-demand functions, βB(f) + βS (l − f) − cA − cI is a constant,
and the proﬁt maximizing and socially optimal interchange fee coincide. (Schmalensee, 2002 and Wright,












Comparing this to the equilibrium interchange fee resulting from competition between schemes, it follows
using (3) that:
Proposition 20 If consumers hold both cards and quasi-demand functions are linear, the equilibrium
interchange fee resulting from competition between identical card schemes facing monopolistic merchants
leads to an interchange fee lower than that which maximizes the schemes’ joint proﬁt, and than that which
maximizes welfare.
Proof. The result follows since
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Allowing for merchant heterogeneity does not change the type of results obtained earlier with a
homogenous merchant. When consumers already hold both cards, competing schemes still set interchange
fees too low, as they attempt to get merchants to accept their cards exclusively.
In an earlier version of the paper (see Guthrie and Wright, 2003) we showed a similar result holds
for the case in which there are two merchants in each industry (with the same bS) which compete
in a Hotelling fashion. Given the linear quasi-demand and quasi-supply speciﬁcation, the equilibrium
interchange fee was found to equal
2
¡








Competition between schemes again resulted in lower interchange fees, and in fact interchange fees that
are less than the privately optimal and socially optimal interchange fee (see Propositions 12 and 13 in
29Guthrie and Wright, 2003).19 Thus, while the analysis is made more complicated by the introduction of
unobservable merchant heterogeneity, the qualitative results obtained for homogenous merchants broadly
carry over to this case.
4.3 Cash-constrained consumers
Another reason why merchants may accept credit cards is to avoid losing sales to cash-constrained con-
sumers. In this section we show how this possibility results in higher equilibrium interchange fees, and so
higher merchant fees and lower card fees. We do so in the context of monopolistic merchants. For such
merchants, the existence of cash-constrained consumers raises the beneﬁts they obtain from accepting
cards. On the other hand, since cash-constrained consumers will have their surplus v extracted from
monopolistic merchants, they do not have a greater incentive to hold or use cards. To help rebalance the
incentives faced by merchants versus cardholders, a higher interchange fee is both privately and socially
optimal. This is true regardless of whether card schemes compete or not.
Assume a proportion q of consumers have insuﬃcient cash to purchase goods. If they hold a card and
the merchant they wish to buy from accepts this card, then such consumers will still be able to purchase.
We assume that q < 1/(1+B), where −B is the minimum value of the function D(x)+(x+v −d+bS −
l)D0(x).20 The next section considers the case of a single card scheme, while Section 4.3.2 examines the
case of two competing schemes.
4.3.1 Single card scheme
The four stages of the game are unchanged, but now a proportion q of consumers have insuﬃcient cash
to purchase at stage (iv); their only method of purchasing the good is using a card. This raises the
possibility that by setting a price p < v, a monopolist merchant might be able to increase demand for its
product from customers who are anyway cash constrained. However, in Appendix B we use the upper
bound on q to show that monopolistic merchants will still want to price to extract all the surplus from
cash consumers, setting a price equal to v. Any higher price will exclude too many cash consumers, while
any lower price will not fully exploit cash consumers. When the merchant sets p = v, its proﬁt equals
π = (1 − q)(v − d + λ(f)D(f)(bS − m)I) + qλ(f)D(f)(v − d + bS − m)I,
which can be written as
π = (1 − q)(v − d) + λ(f)D(f)(bS + q (v − d) − m)I.
The merchant will therefore accept cards if
λ(f)D(f)(bS + q(v − d) − m) ≥ 0.
Equivalently, the merchant will accept cards if ˆ φS(f) ≥ 0, where ˆ φS(f) = D(f)(ˆ bS − m) and ˆ bS =
bS + q(v − d). Much of the analysis in Section 2.1 carries through with bS replaced by ˆ bS everywhere.
In particular, because the merchant’s choice of p = v implies that consumers obtain no surplus from the
good itself, their beneﬁts of holding cards do not depend on whether they are cash-constrained or not.
Our analysis begins with the analog to Lemma 2.
19Note that consistent with the case with homogenous merchants, the equilibrium interchange fee is higher with competing
merchants compared to with monopolistic merchants, and is lower with competing schemes compared to with a single scheme.
20Assuming that the density function h is continuous on [bB,bB] ensures that the function D(x)+(x+v−d+bS −l)D0(x)
is bounded on [bB,bB]. As we showed in the proof of Lemma 8, the lower bound we impose on v − d in Section 2 ensures
that the function, and hence its lower bound, is negative.
30Lemma 8 Suppose some consumers are cash-constrained and a single card scheme has a card fee of f.
If ˆ φS(f) < 0, then monopolistic merchants reject the card and λ(f) = A(0) consumers hold the card.
If ˆ φS(f) ≥ 0, then monopolistic merchants accept the card, and λ(f) = A(−φB(f)) consumers hold the
card.
Proof. We solve the game by working backwards through the stages. The stages are described in turn.
Stage (iv).
If the merchant sets a price p ≤ v and accepts the card, cardholding consumers will use the card
if (i) they are cash-constrained and bB ≥ f + p − v, or (ii) they are not cash-constrained and bB ≥ f.
If the merchant sets a price p > v and accepts the card, cardholding consumers will use the card if
bB ≥ f + p − v. In any other circumstance, consumers will not use a card.
Stage (iii).
Provided it sets its price no higher than v, a merchant obtains proﬁt of
π = (1 − q + qλ(f)D(f + p − v)I)(p − d) + ((1 − q)D(f) + qD(f + p − v))λ(f)(bS − m)I
Alternatively, a merchant can set p > v, in which case it will only sell to cardholders who use cards, so
that
π = λ(f)D(f + p − v)(p + bS − d − m)I.
As we prove in Lemma 12, it will not be proﬁtable for a merchant to set a price diﬀerent from v. Instead,
a monopolist will extract all the surplus from the cash customers by setting p = v, implying it earns a
proﬁt of
π = (1 − q)(v − d) + λ(f)D(f)(bS + q (v − d) − m)I = (1 − q)(v − d) + λ(f)ˆ φS(f)I.
Stage (ii).
Given a merchant obtains a price of v regardless of whether it accepts cards or not, it will accept
cards if and only if ˆ φS(f) ≥ 0. Since consumers gain beneﬁt of
D(f)(β(f) − f)I + u
from holding a card, whether or not they are cash-constrained, a consumer’s beneﬁt from holding the
card is φB(f)I + u. It follows that consumers will hold a card if u > 0 and ˆ φS(f) < 0 (using it only
to withdraw cash and the like). They will also hold a card if u > −φB(f) and ˆ φS(f) ≥ 0. If neither
condition applies, consumers will not hold a card. The equilibria in stage (ii) are thus those characterized
by the lemma. ¥
The next result, which is the analog of Proposition 1, shows that the scheme sets an interchange fee
to drive the merchants’ surplus to zero. This involves the interchange fee being set at aC + q(v − d),
where aC is the corresponding interchange fee without cash-constrained consumers.
Proposition 21 If some consumers are cash-constrained, a single card scheme facing monopolistic mer-
chants sets its interchange fee to solve ˆ φS(f) = 0; that is, at a = ˆ aC ≡ aC + q(v − d).
Proof. A single card association maximizes Π(f) by choosing f to maximize A(−φB(f))D(f) subject to
the constraint ˆ φS(f) ≥ 0 which ensures merchants accept cards. The constraint is equivalent to f+ˆ bS ≥ l.
Since A(−φB(f))D(f) is decreasing in f and the left hand side of the constraint is increasing in f, this
implies the scheme will wish to set f as low as possible subject to the constraint. The constraint will be
31binding and the proﬁt maximizing interchange fee solves ˆ φS(f) = 0, which is precisely the interchange
fee ˆ aC deﬁned in the statement of the proposition. ¥
This is also the welfare maximizing interchange fee.
Proposition 22 If some consumers are cash-constrained, the welfare-maximizing interchange fee for a
single card scheme facing monopolistic merchants is a = ˆ aC.
Proof. See Appendix A.6. ¥
The higher interchange fee is socially desirable since it signals to cash-constrained consumers that
they should hold (and use) cards more often given the surplus their purchases create for merchants. Note
the higher interchange fee resulting from the existence of cash-constrained consumers results in some
excessive usage of cards (by those who are not cash constrained) but this is necessary to help oﬀset the
insuﬃcient holding and usage of cards by those consumers who are cash-constrained.
4.3.2 Competing card schemes
Higher equilibrium interchange fees also result from the existence of cash-constrained consumers when
there are competing schemes. As we prove in Appendix B, provided the proportion of cash-constrained
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which can be rewritten as
π = q (v − d) + ˆ Ψ,
where
ˆ Ψ = λ1ˆ φ1
SI1 + λ2ˆ φ2
SI2 + λ12(ˆ φ1




S = D(fi)(bS + q(v − d) − mi) = D(fi)(ˆ bS − mi).
In particular, merchants’ resistance to accepting cards is lowered as a result of the beneﬁt cards provide
in capturing the surplus of cash-constrained consumers. Other than the fact that bS is replaced by ˆ bS,
and φi
S is replaced by ˆ φi
S, the analysis of Section 3.1 still applies. As before, with all their surplus being
extracted from the purchase of goods, cash-constrained consumers face the same decision about whether
to hold a card or not as other consumers. The following analog of Lemma 4 applies.
Lemma 9 Suppose some consumers are cash-constrained and two identical card schemes compete, with
card schemes 1 and 2 having card fees f1 and f2 respectively.
1. If f1 = f2 then ˆ φ1
S = ˆ φ2
S and there are two cases to consider. If ˆ φ1
S = ˆ φ2
S ≥ 0, then monopolistic
merchants accept both cards and the singlehoming consumers will randomize over which card to
hold. If ˆ φ1
S = ˆ φ2
S < 0, then monopolistic merchants reject both cards and there are no singlehoming
consumers.
2. If fi < fj then four equilibria are possible at stage (ii). If ˆ φi
S, ˆ φ
j
S < 0, then monopolistic merchants
reject both cards and there are no singlehoming consumers. If ˆ φi
S, ˆ φ
j
S ≥ 0 and (λi+λ12)ˆ φi
S ≥ λ12ˆ φ
j
S,
32then monopolistic merchants accept both cards and the singlehoming consumers will only hold card i.
If ˆ φi
S ≥ 0, ˆ φ
j
S < 0, then monopolistic merchants only accept card i and the singlehoming consumers
will only hold card i. If ˆ φ
j
S ≥ 0 and ˆ φi
S < 0 then monopolistic merchants only accept card j and the
singlehoming consumers will only hold card j. (If u > 0, then this equilibrium occurs more generally
if ˆ φ
j
S ≥ 0 and ˆ φi
S < ˆ φ
j
S.)
Proof. We solve the game by working backwards through time.
Stage (iv).
Suppose the merchant sets price p ≤ v. Consumers who only hold card i and are cash-constrained
will use the card if bB ≥ f + p − v and the merchant they buy from accepts the card; if they are not
cash-constrained, they will use the card if bB ≥ f and the merchant they buy from accepts the card. The
card use of cash-constrained consumers who hold both cards and draw bB ≥ min{f1+p−v,f2+p−v} is
described by equations (18), (19) and (20); if they are not cash-constrained the corresponding condition
is that bB ≥ min{f1,f2}.
Alternatively, if merchants set their price above v, then if consumers only hold card i, they will only
use the card if bB + v ≥ fi + p and the merchant they buy from accepts the card. The card use of
consumers who hold both cards and draw bB ≥ min{f1,f2} + p − v is described by equations (18), (19)
and (20).
Stage (iii).
As we show in Appendix B, merchants will extract all the surplus from the cash customers by setting
p = v, implying merchants earn a proﬁt of
π = q(v − d) + ˆ Ψ. (33)
Stage (ii).
In this stage we determine equilibria in the subgame as simultaneous solutions of each party’s best
response, conditional on the card fees and merchant fees set by the two card schemes in stage (i).
The merchant’s best response.
To work out a merchant’s optimal card acceptance policy we note that a merchant will accept cards
if doing so increases the function ˆ Ψ.
We must consider two possibilities for consumers’ card-holding. In the ﬁrst possibility we consider,
no consumers multihome, so that λ12 = 0 and the function ˆ Ψ is determined by the following table:
I2 = 0 I2 = 1
I1 = 0 0 λ2ˆ φ2
S
I1 = 1 λ1ˆ φ1
S λ1ˆ φ1
S + λ2ˆ φ2
S
Recall that if a merchant is indiﬀerent between accepting and rejecting card i because it does not expect
consumers to use card i (so that accepting the card leaves the function ˆ Ψ unchanged), it will accept the
card if doing so increases ˆ Ψ when consumers do use card i. This is true if and only if ˆ φi
S ≥ 0. Merchants
therefore adopt the following policy: merchants reject both cards if ˆ φ1
S, ˆ φ2
S < 0, accept both cards if
ˆ φ1
S, ˆ φ2
S ≥ 0, and accept only card 1 (respectively, card 2) if ˆ φ1
S ≥ 0 > ˆ φ2
S (respectively, ˆ φ2
S ≥ 0 > ˆ φ1
S).
The second possibility is that some consumers hold both cards, so that λ12 > 0. Since L1 and L2 in
equation (22) depend on the values of f1 and f2, we need to consider three diﬀerent cases.
• If f1 = f2 then ˆ φS = ˆ φ1
S = ˆ φ2
S and equation (20) implies that
ˆ Ψ = ˆ φS
¡
λ1I1 + λ2I2 + λ12 ¡
I1 + I2 − I1I2¢¢
.
33In this case the function ˆ Ψ is determined by the following table:
I2 = 0 I2 = 1
I1 = 0 0
¡
λ2 + λ12¢ ˆ φS
I1 = 1
¡
λ1 + λ12¢ ˆ φS
¡
λ1 + λ2 + λ12¢ ˆ φS
Merchants’ best response is to reject both cards if ˆ φS < 0 and to accept both cards if ˆ φS ≥ 0.
• If f1 < f2, then equation (18) implies that
ˆ Ψ = λ1ˆ φ1








In this case the function ˆ Ψ is determined by the following table:
I2 = 0 I2 = 1
I1 = 0 0
¡




λ1 + λ12¢ ˆ φ1
S
¡
λ1 + λ12¢ ˆ φ1
S + λ2ˆ φ2
S
Merchants’ best response is as follows: merchants reject both cards if ˆ φ1
S, ˆ φ2
S < 0; they accept only
card 1 if ˆ φ2
S < 0 ≤ ˆ φ1
S; they accept only card 2 if ˆ φ2
S ≥ 0 and λ12ˆ φ2
S > (λ1 + λ12)ˆ φ1
S; and they
accept both cards if (λ1 + λ12)ˆ φ1
S ≥ λ12ˆ φ2
S ≥ 0.
• Exploiting the symmetry with the above case, merchants’ best response is the same except the
superscripts 1 and 2 are swapped.
Consumers’ best responses.
At stage (ii), consumers decide which card(s) to hold, if any. Their choice of card-holding depends
on the beneﬁts they get from holding a card, which depend on merchants’ acceptance decisions. Since
consumers get no surplus from buying the good itself, cash-constrained consumers get the same beneﬁts








If merchants reject both cards, then consumers with u ≥ 0 will hold two cards, while consumers with
u < 0 will hold no cards. If merchants accept only card i, then consumers will hold both cards if u ≥ 0,
will hold only card i if −φi
B ≤ u < 0 and will hold neither card if u < −φi
B. If merchants accept both
cards but card i has a lower card fee than the other card, then consumers will hold both cards if u ≥ 0,
will hold only card i if −φi
B ≤ u < 0 and will hold neither card if u < −φi
B. If merchants accept both
cards and both cards have the same card fees, then consumers will hold both cards if u ≥ 0, will hold
only a single card if −φ1
B = −φ2
B ≤ u < 0 (in which case consumers will randomize over which card they
will hold), and will hold neither card if u < −φ1
B = −φ2
B. These results are summarized by the functions
λ0(f1,f2) = 1 − A(−φ1
BL1 − φ2
BL2),






34which give the measure of consumers who hold neither card, just card i, or both cards respectively. Note
if u = 0 then λ12 = 0 and no consumers multihome.
Equilibria in the subgame.
Using the characterizations of consumers’ and merchants’ best responses, we can look for cases where
both types of users have best responses to each other at stage (ii) — that is, we can look for possible
equilibria in the subgame starting at stage (ii). There are three cases to consider based on the relative
sizes of f1 and f2.
Case 1: f1 = f2. In this case ˆ φ1
S = ˆ φ2
S. Then from above, an equilibrium in stage (ii) exists if ˆ φ1
S =
ˆ φ2
S ≥ 0. The merchant accepts both cards and the singlehoming consumers will randomize over
which card to hold. An equilibrium also exists in stage (ii) if ˆ φ1
S = ˆ φ2
S < 0, in which case the
merchant rejects both cards and there are no singlehoming consumers.
Case 2: f1 < f2. Then there are four possible equilibria at stage (ii). If ˆ φ1
S, ˆ φ2
S < 0, there is an equi-
librium in which the merchant rejects both cards and there are no singlehoming consumers. If
ˆ φ1
S, ˆ φ2
S ≥ 0 and (λ1 + λ12)ˆ φ1
S ≥ λ12ˆ φ2
S there is an equilibrium in which the merchant accepts both
cards and the singlehoming consumers will only hold card 1. If ˆ φ1
S ≥ 0, ˆ φ2
S < 0 there is an equi-
librium in which the merchant only accepts card 1 and the singlehoming consumers will only hold
card 1. If ˆ φ2
S ≥ 0 and ˆ φ1
S < 0 there is an equilibrium in which the merchant only accepts card 2
and the singlehoming consumers will only hold card 2. (If u > 0, then this equilibrium occurs more
generally if ˆ φ2
S ≥ 0 and ˆ φ1
S < ˆ φ2
S.)
Case 3: f1 > f2. By symmetry, this is the same as the above case except the superscripts 1 and 2 are
swapped.
¥
This implies that for the case in which consumers get no intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards, the
equilibrium interchange fee is still the same as that set by a single monopoly scheme; that is, aC+q(v−d).
Proposition 23 If some consumers are cash-constrained and no consumers get any intrinsic beneﬁt
from holding cards, then the equilibrium interchange fee resulting from competition between identical card
schemes facing monopolistic merchants equals ˆ aC; that is, it solves ˆ φS(f(a)) = 0. Merchants will (just)
accept both cards and card-holding consumers will randomize over which card to hold. Each association
shares in half the card transactions.
Proof. The existence of aC was proven in Lemma 1, guaranteeing that ˆ aC = aC + q(v − d) also exists.
The next step is to prove that this is an equilibrium using our analysis of equilibria in the subgame
starting at stage (ii). From the analysis of consumers’ best responses at stage (ii) of the game, with
u = 0, λ12 = A(0) = 0. No consumers will hold both cards. Note that at ˆ aC, ˆ φ1
S = ˆ φ2
S = 0. If scheme 1
sets a card fee f1 < f(ˆ aC), then ˆ φ1
S < ˆ φ2
S = 0, merchants will accept only card 2 and no consumers will
hold card 1; scheme 1 will get no card transactions. If scheme 1 sets a card fee f1 > f(ˆ aC) instead, then
either ˆ φ1
S ≥ 0, in which case merchants accept both cards and no consumers hold card 1, or ˆ φ1
S < 0, in
which case merchants accept only card 2, and no consumers hold card 1; in either case, scheme 1 will get
no card transactions. Thus, this is indeed an equilibrium.
This equilibrium is unique, since if any scheme i sets a fee structure such that ˆ φi
S > 0, then the other
scheme will always want to attract all consumers to hold its card by setting a lower card fee such that
ˆ φ
j
S ≥ 0 and ˆ φ
j
S < ˆ φi
S. The optimal response of scheme i will be to match this fee structure. If any
35scheme i sets a fee structure such that ˆ φi
S < 0, then merchants will reject its cards and the other scheme
will always want to attract all consumers to hold it cards by setting a fee structure at which merchants
will accept its cards (that is, with ˆ φ
j
S ≥ 0). The optimal response of scheme i will be to change its fee
structure so that ˆ φi
S ≥ 0. Thus, the only equilibrium is one with ˆ φi
S = ˆ φ
j
S = 0. ¥
Where some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from holding cards, the equilibrium interchange fee now
maximizes the modiﬁed surplus of merchants, ˆ φi
S.
Proposition 24 If some consumers are cash-constrained and some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from
holding cards, then the equilibrium interchange fee resulting from competition between identical card
schemes facing monopolistic merchants equals ˆ aM, which maximizes ˆ φi
S, the expected surplus to mer-
chants from accepting cards. Merchants accept both cards and singlehoming consumers randomize over
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Proof. The existence and uniqueness of ˆ aM can be proven in exactly the same way as the existence and
uniqueness of aM was proven in Lemma 1. From the analysis of consumers’ best responses at stage (ii) of
the game, λ12 = A(0) > 0. Some consumers will hold both cards. We use this property and the analysis
of equilibria in the stage (ii) subgame to show that ˆ aM represents an equilibrium interchange fee.
Any scheme (say scheme 1) that sets a higher card fee f1 (lower interchange fee), will result in ˆ φ1
S < ˆ φ2
S,
so will imply an equilibrium at stage (ii) in which merchants accept both cards and the singlehoming
consumers will only hold card 2. The measure of each type of consumer λN, λS and λM will not change
since singlehoming consumers will get the same beneﬁts from holding card 2, as previously they obtained
from randomizing over which card to hold. Scheme 1 will get no card transactions.
Any scheme (say scheme 1) that sets a lower fee f1 (higher interchange fee), will result in ˆ φ1
S < ˆ φ2
S, so
will imply an equilibrium at stage (ii) in which merchants will only accept card 2 and the singlehoming
consumers will only hold card 2. Again, the measure of each type of consumer will not change since
singlehoming consumers will get the same beneﬁts from holding card 2, as previously they obtained from
randomizing over which card to hold. Again, scheme 1 will get no card transactions.
Thus, scheme 1 does strictly worse by setting a higher or lower interchange fee than that which
maximizes ˆ φS, proving that this is an equilibrium.
It remains to prove that this equilibrium is unique. Suppose that it is not. Then there exists some
other equilibrium in which one scheme (say scheme 1) sets an interchange fee such that ˆ φ1
S < ˆ φmax
S .
It is straightforward to show that scheme 2’s best response is to set a diﬀerent interchange fee so that
ˆ φ2
S > ˆ φ1
S, in which case it attracts all card transactions. Thus, there can be no other equilibrium. ¥
The result is a lower equilibrium interchange fee than set by a single scheme:
Proposition 25 If some consumers are cash-constrained and some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from
holding cards, the equilibrium interchange fee resulting from competition between identical card schemes
facing monopolistic merchants leads to an interchange fee lower than that which maximizes the schemes’
joint proﬁt (or joint card transactions).
36Proof. The result ˆ aM < ˆ aC follows immediately from replacing bS with ˆ bS everywhere in the proof that
aM < aC in Lemma 1. ¥
and a lower interchange fee than that which maximizes overall welfare:
Proposition 26 If some consumers are cash-constrained and some consumers get intrinsic beneﬁts from
holding cards, the equilibrium interchange fee resulting from competition between identical card schemes
facing monopolist merchants leads to an interchange fee lower than that which maximizes overall welfare.
Proof. See Appendix A.7. ¥
However, compared to the case without cash-constrained consumers, the equilibrium interchange fee
and the welfare maximizing interchange fee are higher.
4.4 Policy implications
Policymakers in some jurisdictions have claimed that competing credit card schemes (namely, Master-
Card and Visa) set interchange fees too high.21 Policymakers have also charged that there is a lack
of competition between card schemes. For instance, the Reserve Bank of Australia (2002, p. 8) states
“In Australia, credit card interchange fees are not determined by a competitive market.” As a result,
regulators in Australia and in Europe have required that card schemes lower their interchange fees, and
the United Kingdom is investigating similar measures. In a generic two-sided market, there is no obvious
link between greater inter-system competition and lower interchange fees (charging less to merchants
and more to cardholders), or between greater inter-system competition and a more eﬃcient structure of
fees.22 Our analysis provides a model which captures the speciﬁcities of the credit card market in which
without scheme competition payment schemes may set interchange fees too high. In our model, provided
some consumers hold both cards, competition between identical schemes will in fact lower interchange
fees. This suggests that where there is a lack of scheme competition, regulation could improve matters.
In light of our analysis we oﬀer some guidance on this matter.
First, as our model demonstrates, competition may result in interchange fees that are too low, espe-
cially to the extent retailers do not accept cards for strategic reasons. Thus, it is not immediately obvious
that the goal for regulators (in terms of setting interchange fees) should be to replicate the outcome of
competition between schemes.
Where the lower interchange fees resulting from scheme competition do raise social welfare, it would
seem natural to conduct some market analysis to ascertain whether card schemes have market power.
In determining whether card schemes have market power, the policymaker would need to be careful to
take into account the two-sided nature of the services being oﬀered by card schemes. For instance, it
would make no sense to conclude that high card fees imply market power without also considering the
level of merchant fees. In a similar vein, our model provides no basis for the claim by policymakers that
competition should drive interchange fees to cost, or the suggestion that cost-based interchange fees are
eﬃcient.23
A related issue is that it is notable that in the U.S., where competition between credit cards is arguably
quite strong (with DiscoverCard and American Express both competing for custom), interchange fees are
21See European Commission (2002), Oﬃce of Fair Trading (2003), and Reserve Bank of Australia (2002).
22For instance, Rochet and Tirole (2003) ﬁnd in their model of generic competition in two-sided markets that, with
linear demands, a monopoly scheme and competing schemes will set the same structure of fees (and so implicitly the same
interchange fees). Moreover, the resulting structure of fees is socially optimal.
23For instance, see Oﬃce of Fair Trading (2003, 3.12)
37Figure 2: Eﬀect of regulating one payment scheme
0 a
aR aC aNR aΠ
φ(a)
Notes. The equilibrium interchange fee in an unfettered market is aC. The regulated interchange fee is aR.
The scheme that is not regulated will respond by setting its interchange fee at aNR.
higher than in many other countries where competition between credit card schemes seems weaker. A
reason for this could be that competition with other payment instruments (such as debit cards) may
provide a stronger constraining force on interchange fees in other countries than it does in the U.S. In
the U.S., on-line debit cards (which tend to have very low interchange fees) have not been as signiﬁcant as
in most other OECD countries. Thus, in deciding whether there is a lack of scheme competition, policy
makers will likely need to consider types of payment instruments other than just credit cards.
Another issue in the context of interchange fee regulation is that such regulations are currently only
being proposed for card associations (MasterCard and Visa) and not for the proprietary schemes (such
as American Express) which set fees to cardholders and merchants directly. For instance, the Reserve
Bank of Australia proposes regulations of the card associations’ interchange fees which explicitly leave
proprietary schemes free to set their fees. Since proprietary schemes, such as American Express, do not
have to set interchange fees to achieve their desired price structure, any regulation of interchange fees
could act as a potential handicap to card associations.
The consequences of any asymmetric approach to regulation can be examined in the context of our
model, as illustrated in Figure 2. Suppose, for instance, there are two competing schemes, some consumers
hold both cards, and merchants compete in a Hotelling fashion. (The monopoly case can be considered
by replacing φ(f) with φS(f) in Figure 2.) Suppose one scheme has its interchange fee regulated below
the privately set level, while the other remains free to set its interchange fee (or fee structure). Since com-
petition between the schemes constrains the interchange fee to the competitive level aC when merchants
compete in a Hotelling fashion, the result of regulating one scheme and not the other is to constrain
the interchange fee below aC. This leads the rival scheme to take the whole market by setting a higher
interchange fee. Even if merchants continue to accept cards from the regulated schemes, since consumers
now face higher fees for using cards from the regulated scheme, the regulated scheme will not attract any
card transactions. Merchants will continue to accept cards from the unregulated scheme even though the
merchant fees for the regulated scheme are lower, since the more expensive cards allow them to attract
customers from rivals who do not accept such cards. The scheme that is not regulated will respond by
38increasing its interchange fee above aC, although not beyond the interchange fee set by a single card
scheme aΠ, thereby attracting more card transactions and proﬁt. Thus, if card associations have their
interchange fees regulated below the competitive level aC, the model predicts proprietary schemes will
respond by setting higher merchant fees (and lower card fees), and will attract business away from card
associations. Figure 2 illustrates this result by noting the interchange fee chosen by the scheme that is
not regulated, denoted aNR, for a particular interchange fee that is imposed on the regulated scheme,
denoted aR.
The above case provides some insight into the workings of competition between on-line debit cards
oﬀered directly by banks and oﬀ-line debit cards oﬀered by the card associations. On-line debit cards
oﬀered by banks and oﬀ-line debit cards oﬀered by the card associations are similar instruments both
from the perspective of consumers and merchants.24 Moreover, consumers who have access to debit cards
oﬀered by card associations usually also have access to an on-line debit card oﬀered directly by their bank
(this may also be their ATM card). The above results suggest competition between on-line debit and oﬀ-
line debit will drive the interchange fees below the level that the schemes prefer. If card associations try to
set their preferred pricing structure for oﬀ-line debit ignoring the existence of on-line debit (and thus set
relatively high interchange fees), merchants will simply reject oﬀ-line debit knowing that such consumers
will substitute by using on-line debit instead. One way for card associations to prevent this type of
competition would be to tie the acceptance of their oﬀ-line debit cards to acceptance of credit cards,
assuming the interchange fee for credit cards was not subject to the same kind of competitive pressure.
This provides one interpretation of MasterCard and Visa’s tying behavior, behavior that resulted in the
‘Walmart case’.
In 2003 Walmart, together with a large number of other merchants, obtained a settlement of three
billion U.S. dollars from MasterCard and Visa after Walmart alleged MasterCard and Visa tied oﬀ-line
debit and credit cards together, and used market power in credit cards to set high merchant fees for
oﬀ-line debit cards. If merchants accepted Visa credit cards under Visa’s honor-all-cards rule, they also
had to accept Visa oﬀ-line debit cards. Oﬀ-line debit cards have an interchange fee (and merchant fee)
close to the levels used for credit cards, and according to Chakravorti and Shah (2003) are about three
to ﬁve times more expensive for merchants to accept than on-line debit cards. The analysis provides one
channel by which it is possible for the card associations’ tying behavior to improve welfare. It does this
by allowing the scheme to impose a diﬀerent pricing structure for oﬀ-line debit cards from that chosen by
banks for on-line debit, a pricing structure which could be more eﬃcient given that competition between
schemes can result in interchange fees being set too low. On the other hand, the tying behavior could
also allow credit card schemes to set interchange fees for debit that are closer to the monopoly level aΠ,
which could be excessively high.
4.5 Implications for other two-sided markets
One of the main motivations for this paper was to extend the existing literature on two-sided markets
to the case in which one side of the market competes amongst itself to attract users on the other side.
Many two-sided markets have this feature, including payment cards, shopping malls, Yellow Pages, and
hardware/consoles and software providers. By examining the case with monopoly merchants and with
competing merchants we are able to discern how allowing one type of user to compete amongst itself
24Typically, an on-line debit card transaction requires cardholders enter a pin number while an oﬀ-line debit card trans-
action requires cardholders sign to verify the transaction.
39aﬀects the equilibrium structure of fees. Competition between sellers generally increases the privately
and socially optimal interchange fees (meaning it is optimal to charge more to merchants and less to
consumers). When one type of user (sellers) competes amongst itself to attract the other type of user
(buyers), the sellers tend to internalize the beneﬁts of the buyers. This makes it more desirable to
set fees which favor buyers, since by oﬀering more surplus to buyers the schemes will ﬁnd it easier to
attract sellers. On the other hand, regardless of whether sellers compete, competition between schemes
still lowers the relative charge to sellers when some buyers multihome, as schemes compete to be used
exclusively by sellers.
Applying the same logic to other two-sided markets such as consumer directory services suggests
that (i) competition between separate Yellow Pages (or other directories) should reduce the extent to
which they will charge advertizers (and provide free services to consumers) and (ii) competition amongst
advertizers should raise the charges they face. The fact that advertizers cover all of the costs of these
services suggests that the second eﬀect dominates. In a world of monopoly sellers and multihoming buyers,
platforms such as these may charge the buyers and not the sellers for making use of their directories.
Another diﬀerence between payment cards and some other two-sided markets is the possibility for
card schemes to set negative prices for card usage without inducing unbounded consumption.25 Such
pricing would be diﬃcult to implement in the Yellow Pages business, for instance, although there may
be limited opportunities for rebates to customers in other cases. Shopping malls sometimes oﬀer prize
draws and/or free-parking to consumers who make some speciﬁed level of purchases within the mall.
To the extent that prices are constrained to be non-negative on one side of the market, the equilibrium
fee structure could involve services being given free to this side of the market. In such cases, the fee
structure may not respond to the nature of merchant or scheme competition over some range, at least
until a positive fee becomes optimal.
An obvious feature of the equilibrium in our model is that it is sensitive to the ability of consumers
and merchants to coordinate on cards from a particular scheme. We focused on the only pure-strategy
equilibrium, in which schemes competed to attract merchants exclusively. The result of competition was
relatively low merchant fees and high card fees. If, instead, consumers and merchants coordinate on
the other equilibria in the stage (ii) subgame, in which merchants accept both cards and singlehoming
consumers just hold the card with lower fees, then each scheme will have an incentive to set a slightly
higher interchange fee than its rival (until merchants are left with no surplus, at which point either
scheme can attract all merchants exclusively by oﬀering a lower interchange fee). While there is no (pure-
strategy) equilibrium in this case, it does raise the possibility that diﬀerences in users’ beliefs could lead
to divergent outcomes. This result could underlie the fact that sometimes quite diﬀerent fee structures
can emerge in apparently similar two-sided markets. For example, rental agencies (which help match
tenants and landlords) typically charge landlords exclusively for the service, but in some cities such as
Boston and New York the tenant typically pays the entire fee (see Evans, 2002).
5 Conclusions
This paper extended existing models of payment schemes to allow for competition between schemes. It
examined how competition between identical schemes aﬀects the choice of fee structure by card schemes,
namely, how much to charge cardholders versus how much to charge merchants.
25Unbounded consumption is avoided with card transactions since consumers must still purchase the merchant’s good to
enjoy any frequent ﬂyer miles, cash back or other inducements from the issuer.
40There is a concern by policymakers that consumers face distorted incentives to use credit cards, as a
result of low card fees (and other rebates) at the same time that merchant fees are set high. We addressed
one implicit assumption behind the policymaker’s concern — that a lack of system competition explains
why MasterCard and Visa can set high interchange fees, and thus why schemes (including proprietary
schemes) set high merchant fees and low card fees. We showed how scheme competition lowers interchange
fees, although such competition can also result in interchange fees being set below the eﬃcient level. When
some consumers hold multiple cards, merchants tend to reject the more expensive card, causing schemes
to compete by focusing on attracting merchants. Schemes do this by setting low interchange fees (charging
too much to cardholders and too little to merchants).
While competition between schemes lowers equilibrium interchange fees, competition between mer-
chants increases them. Surprisingly, the two types of competition exactly oﬀset in our model. Taking
into account both eﬀects results in an equilibrium interchange fee that is identical to that chosen by a
single scheme which faces a monopoly merchant. Moreover, this interchange fee maximizes the expected
joint surplus of consumers and merchants from using cards. We also showed other scenarios for which
equilibrium interchange fees are either too high or too low, sometimes both from the perspective of card
schemes and of society. For the cases we examined, the results were robust to whether competition is be-
tween card associations or between proprietary schemes, and to whether there is merchant heterogeneity
or not. Future research should consider alternative cases, such as that of imperfect competition between
card schemes as well as between merchants.
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A Proofs




= h(f)(bS − l + f) = h(f)(bS − m)
42equals zero if and only if bS = m since h is positive over its support, dφ/da is positive for larger
values of f and negative for smaller values of f. The unique interchange fee is
aC = bS − cA − πA.
At this interchange fee φS(f) = 0.
2. The ﬁrst order condition is
dφS
da
= −D(f) + h(f)(bS − m) = 0
which, using the fact that l = f + m, implies
dφS
da
= −D(f) + h(f)(f + bS − l) = 0.
The solution is




Note the left hand side is increasing in f while the right hand side is decreasing in f given that the
hazard function h(f)/(1 − H(f)) is increasing in f. Moreover, we have that at bB, the left hand
side of the expression is less than E(bB) which is less than l − bS from (3), while the right hand
side of the expression is greater than l − bS. On the other hand, at bB the left hand side of the
expression is greater than l − bS from (3), while the right hand side of the expression is equal to




= 0. It follows there must exist a unique solution to the ﬁrst order condition,
which we denote fM. The corresponding interchange fee is aM, which is characterized by




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
a=aM





where the ﬁnal step follows from the assumption that the hazard function is increasing in f. Thus,
aM maximizes φS.
3. The condition φ(f) = 0 is equivalent to β(f)+bS = l. Note that E(bB) = β(bB) < β(f) < β(bB) =
bB and so from (3) there is a suﬃciently low interchange fee such that β(f)+bS > l and a suﬃciently
high interchange fee such that β(f)+bS < l. It follows that there exists an interchange fee aΠ such
that β(f) + bS = l. Moreover since β(f) is increasing in f, this interchange fee is unique.




+ l − bS > l − bS = f(aC)
that aM < aC. Furthermore,
f(aC) = l − bS = β(f(aΠ)) > f(aΠ),
where we have used the fact that β(f) > f to complete the last step. It follows that aC < aΠ.
43A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
If φS(f) ≥ 0, then the merchant accepts the card, A(−φB) consumers hold the card, and consumers
who hold the card use it if bB ≥ f. Furthermore, because each transaction involving cards contributes
bB +bS −cA −cI to welfare, and because u and bB are independently distributed, the total contribution




(bB + bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB.
However, consumers also derive beneﬁts simply by holding cards: consumers for whom u ≥ −φB(f) hold




to total welfare, where e is the density function of u. Adding the two welfare components together shows








If φS(f) < 0 then the merchant rejects the card, and only consumers with u ≥ 0 accept the card. In this
case the only contribution to total welfare comes from the intrinsic beneﬁts of card-holding, so that total
welfare is






















(f + bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB + φB(f)A(0) + W0
= (f + bS − cA − cI)D(f)A(−φB(f)) + φB(f)A(0) + W0,










(bB + bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB





(f + bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB
− A(−φB(f))(f + bS − cA − cI)h(f)





26Throughout the paper we ignore additional constant terms in the welfare function that can arise in models in which
consumers incur transportation costs (for instance, in going to their preferred bank or merchant). These can be ignored
because ﬁrms, issuers, acquirers, and card schemes are all symmetric.
44where φ0
B(f) denotes the derivative of φB(f) with respect to f, which equals −D(f). The term in large
brackets in the expression above is always nonpositive. Since a ≤ aC is equivalent to f ≥ l − bS, the
other term in the expression for W0(f) is non-negative. Therefore W0(f) ≤ 0 for all a ≤ aC, and since
W(l − bS) ≥ (πA + πI)D(l − bS)A(−φB(l − bS)) + φB(l − bS)A(0) + W0 ≥ W0,
welfare is maximized by setting a = aC.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
If φ(f) ≥ 0, then merchants accept the card, the proportion of consumers who hold the card is A(−φB)
and consumers who hold the card use it if bB ≥ f. Using a similar argument to that in Appendix A.2,
we can show that welfare equals the expression in equation (A-2) when φ(f) ≥ 0. If φ(f) < 0 then
merchants reject the card, only consumers with u ≥ 0 accept the card, and welfare equals the expression
in equation (A-3).
Using similar arguments to those in Appendix A.2, we can show that when a ≤ aΠ (so that merchants
accept cards),
W(f) ≥ (f + bS − cA − cI)D(f)A(−φB(f)) + φB(f)A(0) + W0
and





The term in large brackets in the expression above is always non-positive.
We consider two possibilities. Firstly, we show that if aΠ > bS−cA+πI, then welfare is maximized by
setting aW = bS −cA +πI. At this interchange fee f(aW) = cA +cI −bS, implying that W0(f(aW)) = 0.
Since W0(f) is negative for lower interchange fees, and is positive for larger interchange fees, this aW is
a local welfare maximum. Since
W(f(aW)) ≥ φB(f(aW))A(0) + W0 ≥ W0,
it is also a global maximum.
Secondly, we show that if aΠ ≤ bS − cA + πI, then welfare is maximized by setting aW = aΠ. Since
f(aΠ) ≥ cA + cI − bS, it follows that W0(f) ≤ 0 for all a ≤ aΠ, Since
W(f(aΠ)) ≥ (f(aΠ) + bS − cA − cI)D(f(aΠ))A(−φB(f(aΠ))) + φB(f(aΠ))A(0) + W0 ≥ W0,
it follows that this aW is a global welfare maximum.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 8
We begin by considering the welfare-maximization problem subject to the additional constraint that
f1 = f2, and then show that relaxing this constraint does not raise welfare.
Suppose f1 = f2. The ﬁrst part of Lemma 4 describes the equilibria which can occur as functions
of the common card fee f. If φS(f) < 0, the monopolist merchant rejects both cards, only customers
with u ≥ 0 hold cards, and these customers hold both cards. Since no card transactions occur, the only





45where W0 is deﬁned in (A-3). If φS(f) ≥ 0, the monopolist merchant accepts both cards, customers hold










to welfare. Customers who hold one or both cards use a card if bB ≥ f. Furthermore, because each
transaction involving cards contributes bB+bS−cA−cI to welfare, and because u and bB are independently




(bB + bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB.




(bB + bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB +
Z 0
−φB(f)
ue(u)du + 2W0. (A-4)
Apart from the addition of a constant W0, this is exactly the same welfare function as that in the proof
of Proposition 2. It is therefore maximized by setting a1 = a2 = aC.
Suppose that f1 6= f2. From the second part of Lemma 4, either there are no singlehoming customers,
or all singlehoming customers hold the same card. In the ﬁrst case, welfare equals 2W0. In the second
case, welfare equals W(fi), where W is deﬁned by equation (A-4) and i is the card held. A necessary
case for the second case to occur is that φi
S ≥ 0. It follows that relaxing the symmetry constraint cannot
raise welfare, completing the proof that a1 = a2 = aC maximizes welfare.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 12
We begin by considering the welfare-maximization problem subject to the additional constraint that
f1 = f2, and then show that relaxing this constraint does not raise welfare.
Suppose f1 = f2. The ﬁrst part of Lemma 5 describes the equilibria which can occur as functions of
the common card fee f. If φ(f) < 0, the merchants reject both cards, only customers with u ≥ 0 hold
cards, and, since these customers hold both cards, total welfare equals W(f) = 2W0. If φ(f) ≥ 0, the
merchants accept both cards, customers hold both cards if u ≥ 0, and hold one card if −φB(f) ≤ u < 0.
Since customers who hold one or both cards use a card if bB ≥ f, we can use a similar argument to
that in Appendix A.4 to show that total welfare equals the expression in equation (A-4). Apart from the
addition of a constant W0, this is exactly the same welfare function as that in the proof of Proposition 4.
It is therefore maximized by setting a1 = a2 = min{aΠ,bS − cA + πI}.
Suppose that f1 6= f2. From the second part of Lemma 5, either there are no singlehoming customers,
or all singlehoming customers hold the same card. In the ﬁrst case, welfare equals 2W0. In the second
case, welfare equals W(fi), where W is deﬁned by equation (A-4) and i is the card held. A necessary
case for the second case to occur is that φi ≥ 0. It follows that relaxing the symmetry constraint cannot
raise welfare, completing the proof that a1 = a2 = min{aΠ,bS − cA + πI} maximizes welfare.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 22
The calculation of overall welfare diﬀers slightly from the calculation in Proposition 2. There, the mer-
chant’s proﬁt from selling the good could be ignored since its sales did not depend on the interchange fee.
Now, however, the level of the interchange fee aﬀects the level of sales to cash constrained consumers.
We therefore include the merchant’s proﬁt from sales to cash-constrained customers.
46If ˆ φS(f) ≥ 0, then the merchant accepts the card, A(−φB) consumers hold the card, and consumers
who hold the card use it if bB ≥ f. A total of A(−φB(f))qD(f) cash-constrained customers are able to
buy the good, contributing
A(−φB(f))qD(f)(v − d)
to overall welfare. Because each transaction involving cards contributes bB +bS −cA −cI to welfare, and





(bB + bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB.
However, consumers also derive beneﬁts simply by holding cards: consumers for whom u ≥ −φB(f) hold




to total welfare, where e is the density function of u. Adding the three welfare components together








where we have used the fact that ˆ bS = bS + q(v − d). If ˆ φS(f) < 0 then the merchant rejects the card,
and only consumers with u ≥ 0 accept the card. In this case, since cash-constrained consumers cannot
buy the good, the only contribution to total welfare comes from the intrinsic beneﬁts of card-holding, so























(f +ˆ bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB + φB(f)A(0) + W0
= (f +ˆ bS − cA − cI)D(f)A(−φB(f)) + φB(f)A(0) + W0,










(bB +ˆ bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB





(f +ˆ bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB
− A(−φB(f))(f +ˆ bS − cA − cI)h(f)






B(f) denotes the derivative of φB(f) with respect to f, which equals −D(f). The term in large
brackets in the expression above is always nonpositive. Since a ≤ ˆ aC is equivalent to f ≥ l − ˆ bS, the
other term in the expression for W0(f) is nonnegative, proving that W0(f) ≤ 0 for all a ≤ ˆ aC. Since
W(l −ˆ bS) ≥ (πA + πI − q(v − d))D(l −ˆ bS)A(−φB(l −ˆ bS)) + φB(l −ˆ bS)A(0) + W0 ≥ W0,
welfare is maximized by setting a = ˆ aC.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 26
We begin by considering the welfare-maximization problem subject to the additional constraint that
f1 = f2, and then show that relaxing this constraint does not raise welfare.
Suppose f1 = f2. The ﬁrst part of Lemma 9 describes the equilibria which can occur as functions
of the common card fee f. If ˆ φS(f) < 0, the monopolist merchant rejects both cards, only customers
with u ≥ 0 hold cards, and these customers hold both cards. Since no card transactions occur, the only





If ˆ φS(f) ≥ 0, the monopolist merchant accepts both cards, customers hold both cards if u ≥ 0, and hold










to welfare. Customers who hold one or both cards use a card if bB ≥ f. Sales to cash-constrained
consumers contribute
A(−φB(f))qD(f)(v − d)
to the merchant’s proﬁt, and therefore to overall welfare. Furthermore, because each actual transaction
involving cards contributes bB+bS−cA−cI to welfare, and because u and bB are independently distributed,




(bB + bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB.




(bB +ˆ bS − cA − cI)h(bB)dbB +
Z 0
−φB(f)
ue(u)du + 2W0. (A-5)
Apart from the addition of a constant W0, this is exactly the same welfare function as that in the proof
of Proposition 22. It is therefore maximized by setting a1 = a2 = ˆ aC.
Suppose that f1 6= f2. From the second part of Lemma 9, either there are no singlehoming customers,
or all singlehoming customers hold the same card. In the ﬁrst case, welfare equals 2W0. In the second
case, welfare equals W(fi), where W is deﬁned by equation (A-5) and i is the card held. A necessary
case for the second case to occur is that ˆ φi
S ≥ 0. It follows that relaxing the symmetry constraint cannot
raise welfare, completing the proof that a1 = a2 = ˆ aC maximizes welfare.
48B Optimal monopoly pricing
In setting its single retail price p, a monopolistic merchant that wants to accept cards faces two alterna-
tives. It can set p = v, so that cardholders who want to use cash will purchase, or it can set p > v, in
which case it will only face demand from cardholders. If there is a single card scheme, the merchant’s
proﬁt is
π = v − d + λ(f)D(f)(bS − m) = v − d + λ(f)D(f)(f + bS − l)
if it sets p = v, and
π = λ(f)D(f + p − v)(p − d + bS − m) = λ(f)D(f + p − v)(f + p − d + bS − l)
if it sets p > v. In the second case the marginal consumer equates the additional beneﬁts of making a
purchase with a card bB with the additional cost f + p − v. The merchant will set p = v if
v − d + λ(f)D(f)(f + bS − l) > λ(f)D(f + p − v)(f + p − d + bS − l).
The following lemma shows that a suﬃcient condition for this result to hold is that




which we assumed in Section 2. This requires that the surplus of the good must be suﬃciently large.27
Lemma 10 Under the no-surcharge rule, if the surplus satisﬁes (B-1) then monopolistic merchants will
set a price p = v when there is a single payment scheme.







≤ v − d + bB + bS − l ≤ v − d + f + bS − l,
with the inequalities being strict when f > bB. This implies that the function
D(f)(v − d + f + bS − l)
is decreasing in f. In particular,
D(f + p − v)(p − d + f + bS − l) < D(f)(v − d + f + bS − l)
whenever p > v (so that f + p − v > f). Therefore, if the merchant sets p > v, it earns proﬁt of
λ(f)D(f + p − v)(p − d + f + bS − l) < λ(f)D(f)(v − d + f + bS − l)
= λ(f)D(f)(v − d) + λ(f)D(f)(f + bS − l)
≤ v − d + λ(f)D(f)(f + bS − l).
That is, its proﬁt from setting p > v is less than its proﬁt from setting p = v. ¥
The merchant’s proﬁt is a more complicated function of the retail price when there are competing
card schemes, although the proﬁt-maximizing choice remains p = v.
Lemma 11 Under the no-surcharge rule, if the surplus satisﬁes (B-1) then monopolistic merchants will
set a price p = v when there are competing card schemes.
27Wright (2003c) makes a similar assumption.
49Proof. If the merchant sets p = v then its proﬁt is


















while if it sets p > v, the merchant’s proﬁt is
πp>v = λ1D
¡
f1 + p − v
¢¡
p − d + bS − m1¢
I1 + λ2D
¡
f2 + p − v
¢¡
p − d + bS − m2¢
I2
+λ12 ¡
D(f1 + p − v)
¡
p − d + bS − m1¢
I1L1 + D
¡
f2 + p − v
¢¡
p − d + bS − m2¢
I2L2¢
.
Using identical arguments to those contained in the proof of Lemma 10, it follows that
D(fi + p − v)(p − d + fi + bS − l) < D(fi)(v − d + fi + bS − l), i = 1, 2,
whenever p > v. This implies that
D(fi + p − v)(p − d + bS − mi) < D(fi)(v − d + bS − mi), i = 1, 2,
whenever p > v, and the proof that πp=v > πp>v follows almost immediately. ¥
The analysis is slightly more complicated when some consumers are cash-constrained. However,
provided we impose some technical conditions, monopolistic merchants will continue to set p = v. We
start with the case of a single payment scheme.
Lemma 12 If the density function h is continuous on [bB,bB], the surplus satisﬁes (B-1), and the
proportion of cash-constrained consumers q is less than 1/(1 + B), then monopolistic merchants will set
p = v when there is a single payment scheme.
Proof. We need to consider three possibilities: p < v, p > v, and p = v.
First, if a monopolistic merchant sets p < v and accepts cards then a cardholding customer who is not
cash constrained will buy the good using a card provided that v +bB −p−f ≥ v −p, which holds if and
only if bB ≥ f, and will buy it using cash otherwise. A cardholding customer who is cash-constrained
will buy the good using a card provided that v+bB −p−f ≥ 0, which holds if and only if bB ≥ f +p−v,
and will not buy it otherwise. Customers who do not hold cards will buy the good using cash unless they
are cash-constrained. In total, the merchant’s proﬁt equals
π = (1 − q + qλ(f)D(f + p − v)I)(p − d) + ((1 − q)D(f) + qD(f + p − v))λ(f)(bS − m)I
Diﬀerentiating with respect to p, and using the assumption that the function D(x)+(x+v−d+bS−l)D0(x)
is bounded below by −B, gives
dπ
dp
= 1 − q + qλ(f)
µ
D(f + p − v) + (f + p + bS − d − l)D0(f + p − v)
¶
I
≥ 1 − q + qλ(f)(−B)I
= 1 − q − qλ(f)BI.





a condition which is guaranteed by our assumption that q < 1/(1 + B). Thus, a monopolistic merchant
will not set p < v.
50Second, suppose a monopolistic merchant sets p > v and accepts cards. Since it is never optimal to buy
the good with cash, a cardholding customer will buy the good using a card provided that v+bB−p−f ≥ 0,
which holds if and only if bB ≥ f + p − v, and will not buy it otherwise, whether or not they are cash
constrained. Customers who do not hold cards will not buy the good. Therefore, the merchant’s proﬁt
equals
π = λ(f)D(f + p − v)(p − d + bS − m)I.
As we showed in the proof of Lemma 10, the merchant can always achieve a higher proﬁt by setting
p = v. ¥
The analysis is further complicated by the presence of competing payment schemes.
Lemma 13 If the density function h is continuous on [bB,bB], the surplus satisﬁes (B-1), and the
proportion of cash-constrained consumers q is less than 1/(1 + B), then monopolistic merchants will set
p = v when there are competing payment schemes.








D(f2 + p − v)(p + bS − d − m2)I2
¶
+ (1 − q)
µ
p − d +
¡
λ1 + λ12L1¢






Diﬀerentiating with respect to p, and using the assumption that the function D(x)+(x+v−d+bS−l)D0(x)
is bounded below by −B, gives
dπ
dp
= 1 − q + q
¡
λ1 + λ12L1¢µ






D0(f2 + p − v)(p + bS − d − m2) + D0(f2 + p − v)
¶
I2







= 1 − q − qB
¡
λ1I1 + λ2I2 + λ12(I1L1 + I2L2)
¢
.
The last line is positive provided that
q <
1
1 + B(λ1I1 + λ2I2 + λ12(I1L1 + I2L2))
,
a condition which is guaranteed by our assumption that q < 1/(1 + B). Thus, a monopolistic merchant
will not set p < v. If a monopolistic merchant sets p > v, its proﬁt is
π = λ1D
¡
f1 + p − v
¢¡
p − d + bS − m1¢
I1 + λ2D
¡
f2 + p − v
¢¡
p − d + bS − m2¢
I2
+λ12 ¡
D(f1 + p − v)
¡
p − d + bS − m1¢
I1L1 + D
¡
f2 + p − v
¢¡
p − d + bS − m2¢
I2L2¢
.
Using identical arguments to those contained in the proof of Lemma 12, it follows that
D(fi + p − v)(p − d + bS − mi) < D(fi)(v − d + bS − mi), i = 1, 2,
whenever p > v, so that a monopolistic merchant will never set p > v. It follows that p = v is the
proﬁt-maximizing price. ¥
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